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"The Borderline Which Separated You
From Me": The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking,
and the Culture of Punishment
Michael L. Perlin*
INTRODUCTION
Our local newspaper-like many newspapers in midsize cities-carries
Parade magazine as a weekend supplement Parade is a mix of fashion tips,
inspirational stories, celebrity interviews, and diet suggestions, with one
"real" article thrown into the mix. This past August, my eyes were caught
by the headline on the cover story: What Teenagers Say About (drugs, sex,
morality, etc.). As the father of two teenagers, it struck me that this might
prove to be valuable reading.
The results were not surprising: only four percent were willing to tell
interviewers that they ever tried drugs, sixty-one percent thought condoms
should be available in schools, and nearly eighty percent said governmental
dishonesty and corruption are widespread.! But what interested me the
most were the results on criminal law-related issues. Eighty-one percent
support the death penalty (slightly higher than the seventy-five percent
reported for adults) ;2 eighty-three percent feel that teenage criminals
should be punished as adults (more than the seventy percent figure
reported for adults);5 over sixty percent fear danger from paroled
prisoners and domestic terrorists (eighty-two percent of adults favor
making it more difficult for defendants convicted of the most violent
crimes to be paroled). 4 And, and this is what particularly piqued my
curiosity, ninety percent believe that the insanity plea is overused,5 a
* Professor of Law, New York Law School A.B., Rutgers University; J.D., Columbia
University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Ken Kress for his insightful and helpful
comments, and Glenn Spiegel for his helpful research assistance on Iowa law. This article is
based on a presentation given at the University of Iowa College of Law, November, 1996 as
part of the Ida Beem Distinguished Visiting Professorship program.
1. See Dianne Hales, How Teenagers See Things, Parade, Aug. 18, 1996, at 4. I must admit
to some skepticism over the small percentage who admitted to drug use.
2. See Christopher Meade, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative Construction of Capital
Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 732, 732 (1996).
3. See Andrew Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Juy Nullification: A Response to Professor
Butler, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 109, 141 n.30 (1996).
4. See James Wootton, Truth in Sentencing-Why States Should Make Violent Criminals Do
Their Time, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 779, 781 (1995).
5. See Hales, supra note 1, at 5.
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number almost identical to that found in a public opinion poll
commissioned in the wake of the verdict in the Hinckley case,6 to which I
will return.
This brought me up short a bit. Do teenagers think about the insanity
plea?7 Do others? Have I ever heard a teenager discuss this? Is this on the
teenage issues agenda?
Intuitively, I do not think this is a high ticket item in most teenage
conversations,8 but have to assume that the numbers reflect something.
Their parents' views? Their teachers' views? Or simply, part and parcel of
an inchoate sense about the criminal justice system, excuse defenses, and
the propriety of a system that appears to exculpate some defendants from
guilt and responsibility in a series of high publicity, emotionally charged
cases?
No matter which (if any) of these explanations is correct, my sense is
that the numbers are significant. Significant because they reflect the fact
that teenagers possess a kind of "ordinary common sense"9 about the use,
overuse, and abuse of the insanity defense that mirrors attitudes of their
parents and neighbors, ofjurors, of legislators, and ofjudges.
In the fifteen years since John Hinckley shot President Reagan, the
national debate over the insanity defense has been less a debate than a
sound byte. The public response to Hinckley's successful use of the
insanity defense resulted in intense scrutiny of the defense and the passage
of the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA).'0 That Act statutorily
overruled decisional law in virtually all federal circuits, replacing it with a
more rigid version of the 1843 M'Naghten cognitive "right and wrong" test,
and imposed restrictive procedural rules on the use of the insanity defense,
placing the burden of proof on the defendant, mandating strict
procedures in retention hearings, and sharply limiting the scope of expert
testimony in insanity defense trials." The states quickly followed
Congress's lead. Twelve states adopted the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI)
test,12 seven narrowed the substantive insanity test, sixteen shifted the
6. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599, 613 n.59 (1989-90) (reporting on results found in
Ray Farabee & James Spearly, The New Insanity Law in Texas: Reliable Testimony and Judicial
Review of Release 24 S. Tex. L. Rev. 671, 671 (1983)).
7. I guess that mine do, but that's simply because they see my books and articles strewn
all over our house.
8. I have never heard it mentioned during the hundreds of telephone conversations my
children have had with their friends or during a like number of car pool rides.
9. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common
Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 Neb. L. Rev. 3 (1990) (discussing the empirical myths about
the insanity defense).
10. Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984).
11. See Perlin, supra note 6, at 638-39 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 17(1)); Fed. R. Evid. 704.
On the "trial of the insanity defense" metaphor, see Morning Edition, Transcript No. 1409-7
(NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 11, 1994) (remarks of Prof. Robert Harriman) (available in
NEXIS/NEWS/NPR database).
12. See generaUy 3 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal (1989), §
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burden of proof, and twenty-five tightened release provisions in the cases
of individuals found Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI) .
Notwithstanding these changes, however, a familiar pattern has
emerged. A defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity in a
controversial case, and the fact of the plea is reported in the local
newspapers. The public responds with letters to the editor decrying the
plea. State legislators become involved, calling for the abolition, or, at
least, the sharp curtailment, of the plea. A counterposition is rarely raised
in the public discussion. 4
Then, the jury returns a verdict and the responses are predictable. If a
jury says, "guilty," then that verdict is seen as a reflection of the fact that
the system "works." If, on the other hand, the case is in that universe of
less than one-tenth of one percent of all felony cases in which a jury
returns an NGRI verdict, then that verdict is seen as a reflection of a
breakdown of the entire criminal justice system. Earlier this fall, John
Hinckley applied for a one-day-a-month conditional release from St.
Elizabeth's Hospital. Public response was, as could be expected, totally
negative: "No," "No, that's stupid," "No way no way no way." 5
I believe that the insanity defense has always been a symbol and a
screen. It has always served as a litmus test for how we feel about a host of
social, political, cultural and behavioral issues that far transcend the
narrow questions of whether a specific defendant should be held
responsible for what-on its surface-is a criminal act, or how responsibili-
ty should be legally calibrated, or of the sort of institution in which a
successful insanity acquittee should be housed.
At its base, how we feel about the insanity defense illuminates how we
feel about the relationships between mental health and the law, between
mental health professionals and judges, between criminals and victims,
between the media and the trial process, between the law-abiding and the
law-flaunting. In short, our feelings about the insanity defense reflect our
15.09, at 307-13.
13. See Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense: Deconstructing the Myths and Reconstructing the
Jurisprudence, in Law, Mental Health, and Mental Disorder 341, 347 (Bruce Sales & Daniel
Shuman eds., 1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Deconstructing the Myths]; Michael L Perlin, "No
Direction Home": The Law and Criminal Defendants With Mental Disabilities, 20 Ment. & Phys. Dis.
L. Rep. 605, 606 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, No Direction].
14. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of
Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 5 (1996). For example, outcry over
insanity verdicts in specific cases has recently led to calls for abolition in North Carolina, see,
e.g., F. Alan Boyce, Hayes Verdict Sparks Legislation, AP Political Service, April 21, 1989;
Pennsylvania, see, e.g., Changes to Insanity Defense Debated, Pa. L. Wkly., June 24, 1996, at 2; Be
Cautious In Revising Insanity Law, Allentown (Pa.) Morning Call, Mar. 4, 1996, at A6;
Oklahoma, see, e.g., Janet Pearson, Who's Competent to Stand Trial? Courtroom Confusion Leads to
Frustration, Misunderstanding, Tulsa World, May 19, 1996, at Gi; and New York, see, e.g., Billy
House, Lawmakers Want to Revamp Insanity Defense, Gannet News Service, Feb. 8, 1994.
15. Morning Edition, Transcript No. 1965-11 (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 17, 1996)
(available in NEXIS NEWS/NPR database).
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feelings about borderlines, and it is this image that is central to this paper.
Insanity defense jurisprudence is based on a series of myths (legal
myths, judicial system myths, and behavioral myths), and we cannot
possibly understand the insanity defense unless we unpack these myths, lay
them bare, and discuss their mythic nature. 6 We cannot understand the
insanity defense unless we look at it through the cognitive psychology
construct of "heuristics," that is, the way that we seek to simplify
information-processing tasks by privileging the vivid, negative, accessible
anecdote, and by subordinating the factual, the logical, the statistical, the
rational. Furthermore, we cannot understand the insanity defense unless
we come to grips with the meretricious allure of a false "ordinary common
sense" (OCS) that has long pervaded our jurisprudence in this area. 8
The overarching question to explore is: Why do we feel the way we do
about these people (insanity pleaders), and how does the answer to that
question preordain our answers to almost all of the legal and behavioral
questions that are posed in this area?' 9 Even that answer does not help us
much, unless we look at insanity defense developments through the twin
filters of "sanism" (irrational prejudice based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization) 20  and
"pretextuality" (the ways that courts often accept testimonial dishonesty
and engage in dishonest decisionmaking) ,2 and under the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence (a means of studying the law as a therapeutic
agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers'
roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences).2
Structural anthropology may also give us more insights as to why we
feel the way we do, as well as why our society is discomforted whenever it
appears that "sane" and "insane" may not be the same type of a set of
concepts as are "cold" and "hot" or "black" and "white." 23 And if we do
not acknowledge our profound ambivalence about this discomfort, our
efforts to understand the defense will fail:
The developrment of the insanity defense has tracked the
tension between psychodynamics and punishment, and reflects
our most profound ambivalence about both. On one hand, we are
16. See generally Perlin, supra note 6 (discussing the process of unpacking insanity myths).
17. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 12-22.
18. Id. at 23-38.
19. See Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 383-92 (1994).
20. Id. at 295, 385-86; see generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L Rev. 373
(1992) (discussing the insidious effects of prejudice against people with disability).
21. Perlin, supra note 18, at 395-96; see generally Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental
Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 625 (1993) (discussing pretextuality
in the mental disability law context).
22. Perlin, supra note 19, at 417-19; see generally Michael L Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. Sch.J. Hum. Rts. 623 (1993) (discussing the impact of law on mentally
disabled individuals).
23. Perlin, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing the problems caused by the possibility of more
than one type of categorization).
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especially punitive toward the mentally disabled, "the most
despised and feared group in society"; on the other, we recognize
that in some narrow and carefully circumscribed circumstances,
exculpation is-and historically has been-proper and necessary.
This ambivalence infects a host of criminal justice policy issues
that involve mentally disabled criminal defendants beyond insanity
defense decisionmaking: on issues of expert testimony, mental
disability as a mitigating (or aggravating) factor at sentencing and
in death penalty cases, and the creation of a "compromise" GBMI
verdict.
The post-Hinckley debate revealed the fragility of our
insanity defense policies, and demonstrated that there was simply
not enough "tensile strength" in the criminal justice system to
withstand the public's dysfunctionally heightened arousal that
followed the jury verdict. In spite of doctrinal changes and
judicial glosses, the public remains wed to the "wild beast" test of
1724, a reflection of how we truly feel about "those people." It
should thus be no surprise that, when Congress chose to replace
the ALI/Model Penal Code insanity test with a stricter version of
M'Naghtem, that decision was seen as a victory by insanity defense
supporters.
These dissonances, tensions and ambivalences-again, rooted
in medieval thought-continue to control the public's psyche.
They reflect the extent of the gap between academic discourse
and social values, and the "deeply rooted moral and religious
tension" that surrounds responsibility decisionmaking. They lead
to sanism, to pretextuality and to teleological decisionmaking.
They seek confirmation in "ordinary common sense" and in the
use of heuristic cognitive devices. Ours is a culture of
punishment, a culture that grows out of our authoritarian spirit.
Only when we acknowledge these psychic and physical realities-
and the anthropology of insanity defense attitudes-can we expect
to make sense of the underlying jurisprudence.2 4
All of this is but a start. We must dig deeper in an effort to determine
why we feel the way we do, to determine what it is about our communal
psyche that responds to insanity pleaders and the insanity defense the way
we do, and why the symbol of the insanity defense retains its power in spite
of the rarity with which it is used, the greater rarity of its success, and the
high costs of pleading the defense (whether that plea be successful or
unsuccessful). We must also explore why the judiciary--and especially the
United States Supreme Court-can offer us "no direction home" in our
efforts to bring coherence to this most incoherent area of law.2
My title for this paper comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's epic song,
Idiot Wind, an angry, coruscating and brilliant polemic that indicted
24. Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideas, Images, and Distorted Facts": The Insanity Defense, Genetics
and the "Political World," in The Criminal Gene Controversy: The State of Science and the Law
(Jeffrey Botkin, ed. 1998) (in press) (manuscript at 46-48 (footnotes omitted)).
25. See generally Perlin, No Direction, supra note 13.
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American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam War period. Sang Dylan:
I been double-crossed now for the very last time and now
I'm finally free
I kissed goodbye the howling beast on the borderline which
26separated you from me.
To a significant percentage of the American public, the insanity
defense is a "howling beast" that has "double-crossed" efforts at the
implementation of a sane (irony intended) criminal justice system. It is one
from which many of us wish we were "finally free." And, most importantly,
it sits at the "borderline which separates you from me." For I am convinced
that, to a majority of the American public, the debate over the insanity
defense is a debate over that "borderline." We struggle with our
ambivalence over that borderline, our need for that borderline, and our
wish to deny that borderline. And until we understand that and come to
grips with tha4 our efforts to understand the defense are doomed to
failure.
In Part I, this paper briefly recounts the changes, both substantive and
procedural, in the insanity defense that followed the verdict in the
Hinckley case. Part II explores the way society feels about punishment and
the way that society's urge to punish "the factually guilty" drives all aspects
of criminal justice policy, including specifically and especially the insanity
defense. Part III considers the role of authoritarianism in the American
fabric and the linkages between the authoritarian personality and insanity
defense policy. Part IV examines structural anthropology in hopes of
finding some answers, or, at least, in hopes of finding some illumination of
some of the most important questions. It then looks at the myths that
dominate insanity defense jurisprudence, considering specifically the "fear
of faking" myth, perhaps the most compelling and dominating myth in all
of criminal procedure. Part V briefly considers recent developments in
Iowa, including press coverage of recent insanity defense cases, in an effort
to determine how much Iowa is or is not like the rest of the nation. Part
VI looks at the issue through the jurisprudential filters of sanism,
pretextuality, and teleology in hopes of illuminating the underlying issues.
Finally, Part VII directly confronts the Dylan lyric that serves as the
epigrammatic piece of the paper's title, and considers how society's psychic
need to reify the existence of that "borderline" dominates this area of
jurisprudence.
I. THE HINCKLEY CASE AND BEYOND
27
The acquittal of John W. Hinckley galvanized the American public in
a way that led directly to the reversal of 150 years of study and
understanding of the complexities of psychological behavior and the
26. Bob Dylan, Idiot Wind, in Bob Dylan, Lyrics, 1962-1985, at 367-68 (1985).
27. This section is generally adapted from Perlin, Deconstructing the Myths, supra note 13,
at 347-48.
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relationship between mental illness and certain violent acts. 28 The public's
outrage over a jurisprudential system that could allow a defendant who
shot an American president on national television to plead "not guilty"
became a "river of fury" after the jury's verdict was announced.2
Sensational and extreme trials such as Hinckley's consume the hearts
and minds of the American public. They reflect society's basic dissatisfac-
tion with the perceived incompatibility of the due process and crime
control models of criminal law, and with the notion that psychiatric
excuses can allow a guilty defendant to "beat a rap" and escape
punishment.30 Such dissatisfaction leads to a predictable response,
especially when the defendant, like Hinckley, is perceived as one not
sufficiently "like us" to warrant empathy or sympathy. As Dr. Loren Roth
suggests, when a "wrong verdict" is entered in a sensational trial, the
American public may simply be nothing more than a "bad loser."3'
In retrospect, this firestorm should have been entirely predictable. To
the public, the defense strategy, the trial and the subsequent verdict were
vivid reifications of many of the most powerful insanity defense myths. An
intelligent, albeit troubled, defendant plans a fiendish crime (not
coincidentally, against one of the nation's most beloved and patriarchal
political leaders), hires an expensive Washington, DC law firm, retains a
panel of heavily-credentialed forensic mental health witnesses, and
proceeds to successfully bamboozle a well-meaning (but evidently out of its
depths) lay jury so as to avoid severe punishment. The public, to no one's
532surprise, reacted with swift outrage.
Members of Congress responded quickly to the public's outpouring of
outrage, introducing twenty-six separate pieces of legislation designed to
limit, modify, severely shrink or abolish the insanity defense.,33 Statements
by legislators introducing these bills and by Reagan Administration
28. See Perlin, supra note 6; Perlin, supra note 9.
29. Michael L. Perlin, The Things We Do For Love: John Hinckley's Trial and the Future of the
Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts 30 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 857, 859 (1985) (reviewing Lincoln
Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the Trial ofJohn W. Hinckley, Jr. (1984)).
30. See, e.g., Linda C. Fentiman, Guilty But Mentally Ilk The Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L.
Rev. 601 (1985) (discussing public perceptions to cases in which the insanity defense was
successful); Benjamin Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretative Theory of the Insanity
Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime 74 Geo. L.J. 1371 (1986) (discussing the implications
of the insanity defense on societal standards of conduct and respect). On the Hinckley case as
an "extreme" one, see Ted Gest and Constance Johnson, The Justice System: Getting a Fair Trial,
112 U.S. News & World Rep., May 25, 1992, at 36.
On the extent to which "hard evidence" (a CAT scan) swayed the jury in the Hinckley
case, see Jennifer Kulynych, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior Neuroimages as Scientific
Evidence, 36JurimetricsJ. 235 (1996).
31. Loren H. Roth, Preserve But Limit the Insanity Defense, 58 Psychiatric Q. 91, 91 (1986-
87).
32. See Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the Trial ofJohn W. HinkleyJr. 101-02
(1984) (discussing the public reaction in the aftermath of Hinkley's acquittal); 3 Perlin, supra
note 12, § 15.36, at 390-01 (same).
33. Perlin, supra note 29, at 860; Perlin, supra note 6, at 614.
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spokespeople supporting them reflected the fears and superstitions that
have traditionally animated the insanity debate, as well as the public's core
ambivalence about mentally disabled criminal defendants.m
The Reagan Administration originally called loudly for the abolition
of the insanity defense."' However, in the face of a nearly-unified front
presented by most of the relevant professional organizations and trade
associations, it quietly dropped its call for abolition and supported the
IDRA as a reform compromise.m This quiet change in position ensured
that the symbolic call for abolition would be the lasting public image.
The legislative debate was utterly predictable. State and federal
legislators and federal prosecutors repeated discredited and outdated
myths based on ancient superstitions, and then conceded that their actions
were driven by myth, not reality. Their statements went unchallenged; the
empirical evidence refuting them went unnoticed. Had a mid-19th century
Member of Parliament stumbled into one of the legislative arenas during
this debate, he would have felt, correctly, that nothing had changed in the
140 years that passed since the M'Naghten rules were articulated.
Congress responded directly and swiftly to public perceptions of a
system run amok, a system that, purportedly, allowed uncountable numbers
of dangerous defendants to escape punishment through the meretricious
loophole of the insanity defense. Even though Congress clearly knew that
this perception was a myth, it responded as it did in order to assuage these
fears and persuade the voters that it was doing something by laudably
enhancing public protection values. In short, it participated knowingly and
openly in a massive legislative charade. The legislation ultimately enacted
by Congress, legislation that closely comported with the public's moral
feelings, returned the insanity defense to "status quo ante 1843: the year
of... M'Naghten." All of this had the ultimate effect of returning to a test
that compelled the law to "do its punitive worst," that had "the rigidity of
an army cot and the flexibility of a Procrustean bed," that retained the
flavor "of the celebrated concepts of Hale and Coke of the 17th century,"
and that was, simply, "bad psychiatry and bad law."37
34. See Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise. The Guilty But Mentally I1 Verdict Has Both
Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55
U. Gin. L. Rev. 943 (1987) (discussing public reactions to particularly well publicized insanity
plea cases); Perlin, supra note 6, at 610-614.
35. See Perlin, supra note 29, at 860 n.9 (noting that the Reagan administration wished to
retain the insanity plea only where the defendant lacked the sufficient mens rea of the
charged offense due to mental incapacity).
36. See 3 Perlin, supra note 12, § 15.39, at 398-99 n.743 (describing the compromise
legislation).
37. Jodi English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional
Insanity Defense, 40 Hastings LJ. 1, 47 (1988); Robert Sadoff, Insanity: Evolution of a Medicolegal
Concept, paper presented at College Night, the College of the Physicians of Philadelphia 20
(Sept. 1986).
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II. THE ROLE OF PUNISHMEN 3 5
A reading of the voluminous testimony at these legislative hearings
clarifies one point above nearly all others: Congress and the state
legislatures-reflecting the public's mood-were in a fiercely punitive
mood, a mood stoked by outrage over the fact that Hinckley appeared to
"get away with it." 9 Before considering the discrepancy between the
public perception and reality, it is useful, indeed essential, to think about
punishment and its role in the criminal justice system. It is also helpful to
reflect on society's frustration when an individual verdict, especially a
verdict in a famous case, appears to thwart, or, better, to flaunt, society's
need to punish.
Punishment is a coercive, symbolic, judgmental, state-inflicted,
condemnatory, normative, proportional deprivation 40 that "has been the
main device for enforcing laws ever since the mists of prehistory lifted."4'
At least five major aims of punishment have been identified by
criminologists and philosophers: restraint, general deterrence, individual
deterrence, rehabilitation, and desert.42 As recently as 1974, Professor
Schulhofer noted that most American jurisdictions exclude retaliation from
the legitimate goals of the criminal law, that legal theorists "[we]re virtually
unanimous in applauding the judgment,"4 3 and that the idea of
38. This section is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 9, at 49-69.
39. See id. at 16-28 nn.20-76 (citing sources).
40. See generally Sidney L Barnes, Evolutionary Implications of Legalized Punishment
(1974) (discussing the principle elements of criminal punishment); Jerome Hall, General
Principles of Criminal Law 310-12 (2d ed. 1960) (same).
41. Ernest van den Haag, Punishing Criminals 4 (1975). The religious roots of
punishment theory have never been far from the surface. See Walter Bromberg, From Shaman
to Psychotherapist: A History of the Treatment of Mental Illness 220 (1975), citing Moore v.
Stickling, 33 S.E. 274, 278 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1899) ("The morality of our laws is the morality of
the Mosaic interpretation of the Ten Commandments, modified only as to the degree and
kind of punishment....").
42. On general deterrence, see, e.g., Johannes Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influence
of Criminal Law, in Law, Justice and the Individual in Society: Psychological and Legal Issues
50 (June L Tapp and FeliceJ. Levine eds., 1977). See alsoJohannes Andenaes, Determinism and
Criminal Law, 47J. Crim. L., Criminology & Pol. Sci. 406 (1956).
On rehabilitation, for an excellent analysis of the "exciting and ... troubling" aspects of
the therapeutic orientation implicit in the rehabilitative ideal in punishment, see David B.
Wexler, TherapeuticJustice, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 289, 337 (1972); on the link between punishment
and treatment of the mentally disabled criminal defendant, see Lord Devlin, Mental
Abnormality and the Criminal Law, in Changing Legal Objectives 71, 76 (R. St. J. MacDonald
ed., 1963); on the relationship between the retributive model and the medical model of
criminal justice, see John 0. Beahrs, Volition, Deception, and the Evolution ofJustice, 19 Bull. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry & L. 81 (1991).
On desert, see, e.g., Willard Gaylin & David J. Rothman, Introduction to Andrew Von
Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments xxi, xxix (1976) (distinguishing desert
from vengeance).
43. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497, 1510-1511 (1974) (footnote omitted). See,
e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the dominant
1383
1384 82 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1997]
punishment was giving way to the idea of treatment.44 Yet, the notion of
desert has since regained prominence as the most important contemporary
justification for and aim of punishment.4 The Supreme Court's 1991
decision upholding a first offender's sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for a cocaine possession conviction specifically invokes retribution as
one of the acceptable rationales for such a penalty.
46
Since this decision, increasingly punitive attitudes toward criminals
have appeared throughout the criminal justice system. Although penal
theories are known to be cyclical,48 the dominant trends in current social
and criminal philosophy emphasize retribution and containment of the
criminal, and society's right to protection.4 ' The roots of this philosophi-
cal switch are complex, but public perceptions of rising crime rates and
unpunished criminals are probably the major cause. 5°
objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence .... "); Regina v. Sargent, 60 Crim. App. 74, 77
(Eng. C.A. 1974) ("The Old Testament concept of an eye for an eye and tooth for tooth no
longer plays any part in our criminal law.").
44. Devlin, supra note 42, at 75-76. Lord Devlin made it clear that he was not referring
solely to cases involving mentally disabled prisoners:
No doubt there are still judges who think of psychiatrists as persons who invent long
names for simple sins; and no doubt there are psychiatrists who think of the criminal
calendar as a list of mental disorders with antiquated names, taken from the Ten
Commandments. But both these extreme schools of thought are dying out. The idea
of punishment is giving way-and here I am not concerned solely with mental abnonnali-
ty-with the idea of treatment.
Id. (emphasis added).
45. See Perlin, supra note 19, at 53 n.198.
46. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
& concurring in judgment) ("[T]he Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the
threat posed to the individual and society by possession of this large an amount of cocaine
[more than 650 grams]-in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement-is momentous
enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole.").
47. I speak here primarily of public attitudes as reflected in changes in legislation and
judicial opinions that appear to respond to opinion polls, popular surveys, and the like. See
e.g., Anthony Doob & Julian Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward
Sentencing, 16 Can.J. Behav. Sci. 269 (1984) (suggesting that public attitudes towards criminal
sentences are negatively impacted by the insufficiency of material available in mass media
reports on criminal cases); James Alan Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman
Years, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 499 (1990-91) (noting the increase in public support
of the death penalty since the 1970s); Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, Sentencing and
Public Opinion: Taking False Shadows for True Substances, 27 Osgoode Hall LJ. 491 (1989)
(noting the increase in the public's interest in the sentencing process).
48. SeeJonas Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 43 (1980) (discussing examples).
49. See Cornelis LJ. Stokman & Patricia G. Heiber, The Insanity Defense Reform Act in New
York State, 1980-1983, 7 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 367, 367 (1984); see also Richard J. Bonnie,
Morality, Equality, and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Criminal
Law, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 5, 6 (1984) (discussing the recent "reinvigoration of
the moral basis of punishment.").
50. See generally Francis T. Cullen et al., Attribution, Salience, and Attitude Toward Criminal
Sentencing, 12 Crim. Just. & Behav. 305 (1985) (noting the relationship between a person's
outlook on crime and his attitude towards punishment). Ours is not the first generation to
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Punishment was originally needed to "remove the evil spirit thought
to cause an individual to transgress against society." 5' It is a ritualistic
device conveying "moral condemnation," 2 "inflicting humiliation,"' 3 and
dramatizing evil through a public "degradation ceremony."14 As many
forms of crime were identified with sin,55 they were thus believed to
challenge "God and organized religion."55 Importantly, these opinions
have not entirely disappeared; recent research suggests that many people
rate all offenses, regardless of seriousness, as "equally morally wrong," and
"equate crime with sin."57
Punishment ceremonies stimulate socialization through a process
which involves the internalization of normative social behavior rules.58
The relinquishment of personal retaliation to the social institution involves
a mutual agreement whereby all parties suppress their own, personal
retaliative impulses by turning the problem of punishment over to the
sovereign.5 9  This avoids "the greater evil of mob violence."60  By
have come to this conclusion. See, e.g., Walter B. Miller, Ideology and CriminalJustice Policy: Some
Current Issues, 64J. Grim. L. & Criminology 141, 141 (1973) ("Few generations have been free
from the conviction that the nation was in the throes of 'the crisis of our times,' and such
perceptions have not always corresponded with judgments of later historians.").
51. Jon Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter. A Critical Analysis of Modem Probation
Conditions, 1989 Duke LJ. 1357, 1360 (citing Harry Barnes, The Story of Punishment: A
Record of Man's Inhumanity to Man 39 (1930); David Dressier, Practice and Theory of
Probation and Parole 3 (2d ed. 1969)).
52. Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality, 77J. Grim.
L. & Criminology 969, 1004 (1986) (quoting Gordon Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The
Educative, Moralizing and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 550, 553-60); see also Hawkins,
supra, at 555 ("Punishment is a ritualistic device designed to influence by intimating
symbolically social disapproval and society's moral condemnation.").
53. Christopher Hibbert, The Roots of Evil: A Social History of Crime and Punishment 32
(discussing the use of sticks, pillory, branding iron, ducking stool, and scarlet letters).
54. Boldt, supra note 52 (quoting Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies,
61 Am. J. Soc. 420, 421-423 (1956)); see also Samuel J. Brakel, Presumption, Bias and
Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1105, 1116 (describing the criminal trial
as a "morality play"); Brilliant, supra note 50, at 1361 (noting the role of degradation in
punishment theories).
55. On the biblical roots of the link between crime, punishment, and sin, see Lasky, The
Paradigm of Religion, Medicine, and Capital Punishment; 14 Med. Sci. & L. 26, 27 (1974)
(discussing symbols of Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel and concluding, "Crime and
punishment are coeval in the history of the world, and it is difficult to say which had
priority".).
56. Harry Elmer Barnes, The Repression of Crime 25 (1926). See also, David Rothman,
The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic 15 (1971)
(noting that early American colonists equated crime with sin).
57. See, e.g., Steven Burkett & David Ward, A Note on Perceptual Deterrence Religiously Based
Moral Condemnation, and Social Control 31 Criminology. 119, 122 (1993), reporting on research
in Mark Warr, What Is the Perceived Seriousness of Crimes, 27 Criminology 795 (1989).
58. Boldt, supra note 52, at 1004-05 (quoting Garfinkel, supra note 54, at 421, and
Hawkins, supra note 52, at 557-60).
59. See Andrew S. Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 611, 611-612 (1958).
60. Schulhofer, supra note 43, at 1511.
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nurturing emotions of vengeance, the punishment of criminals "furthers
social solidarity and protects against the terrifying anxiety that the forces of
good might not triumph against the forces of evil after all."' It does this
through the context of a trial process that is a "moral parable [with] a
religious meaning essential as a public exercise in which the prevailing
moral ideals are dramatized and reaffirmed."62 Margaret Radin has thus
speculated:
Maybe the death penalty symbolizes the arbitrary, alien
power of government over life and death; the government as
avenging God run amok; our relinquishment of social
responsibility to the government to fix things for us by
conveniently getting rid of some bad actors. Maybe by attacking
this symbol we play a part in the struggle for a more humane
political order.63
Punishment thus is clearly a socially-sanctioned "safety valve"''
6
through which law-abiders express community condemnation of wrong
doers, 5 especially the wrongdoers whom we fear the most.6 In this way,
punishment is imbued with an important symbolic significance:67 more
than mere disapproval, it expresses "a kind of vindictive resentment" as a
"way of getting back at the criminal."o When society identifies those who
are criminals, it can "keep straight who is good and who is bad." This
may be the reason that "the moment ... rehabilitative impulses emerge
into expressions, the legal system is doomed to encounter contradiction,
61. Bernard Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A FutileJourney 1973 Wash. U. L.Q. 109,
110. See generally Barnes, supra note 55, at 25 ("Society felt outraged at such an act of voluntary
perversity and indignantly retaliated by a savage manifestation of group vengeance."); Henry
Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-41 (1956) (describing roots of the urge to punish);
Gregory Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment 69-88 (1954)
(describing roots of the urge to punish).
62. Philip Q. Roche, The Criminal Mind 245 (1958).
63. Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1165, 1175 (1985).
64. See Schulhofer, supra note 43, at 1512 ("Even if popular resentment would not lead to
mob violence, it can be argued that giving an outlet for this resentment will contribute to the
psychological health of the community.").
65. "[Vlengeance is exercised against those who offend custom, who transgress tradition,
and who attack the constituted order of things and those who tend by their conduct to break
down the structure of society." William A. White, Insanity and the Criminal Law 16 (1923).
66. See Michael Davis, Setting Penalties: What Does Rape Deserve? 3 Law & Phil. 61, 81 (1984)
(describing fear-based analyses).
67. See generally Rick Lovell & Stan Stojkovic, Symbols, and Politymaking in Corrections, 2
Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 225, 226-233 (1987) (examining the role of myths and symbols in
helping provide "long-term stability" to correctional policy development); Meade, supra note
2, at 744-747 (describing the symbolic role of the death penalty); Tom R. Tyler & Renee
Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime of Symbolic Attribute?, 17 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 21, 26-27 (1982) (discussing punitiveness as a symbolic attitude).
68. Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 100
(1970).
69. Edward De Grazia, Crime Without Punishment: A Psychiatric Conundrum, 52 Colum. L.
Rev. 746, 764 (1952).
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confusion and frequent public criticism."70
This symbolic function explains "why even those sophisticated persons
who abjure resentment of criminals and look with small favor generally on
the penal law are likely to demand that certain kinds of conduct be
punished when or if the law lets them go by. 01 Punishment furthers "the
mythology of justice, [by] creating the illusion that the world is fair."7 As
Professor Elyn Saks has astutely noted, "Society's perception that the person
is being punished is perhaps the most important consideration" in
assessing the role of punishment in the criminal justice system.73
The standards enforced by such punishment transcend the "rock-
bottom prohibitions of the criminal law"; they include "the affirmative
standards and ideals of the group with which we wish to identify." 74
Punishment expresses to other members of the community "its self-image
as a society" that places great value on the "preservation of designated
interests." 75 This expression is all the more pointed when the defendant is
enough unlike other members of society that they neither empathize nor
sympathize. As Professor Stanley Ingber has noted, "The criminal process
is... a pageant which dramatizes the differences between 'we' and 'they'
by portraying a symbolic encounter between the two."76
This reading, however, does not fully detail punishment's roots Why
do members of society have the feelings that make them need to express
this vindictive resentment? Also, why does society choose to punish some
offenders more harshly than others who commit like crimes? 7 Why does
70. Watson, supra note 59, at 226.
71. Feinberg, supra note 68, at 102. See also 3 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self: The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law (1986). It is precisely this attitude that surfaces in the charge that
the insanity acquittee somehow "beats the rap." Herbert Morris has focused attention
explicitly on the symbolism of punishment:
As a response to guilt, punishment must be seen, then, as freighted with rich
symbolic significance, and in considering what might justify punishment we risk, I
believe, incompleteness in our theories if we neglect this symbolic baggage.
Herbert Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 Ethics 62, 65 (1988).
72. Diamond, supra note 61, at 110.
73. Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 383, 416 (1992) (emphasis in original).
74. Henry Weihofen, Capacity to Appreciate "Wrongfulness" or "Criminality" Under the A.L.I.-
Model Penal Code Test of Mental Responsibility, 58 J. trim. L, Criminology & Police Sci. 27, 30
(1967).
75. Sendor, supra note 30, at 1428-29 n.208.
76. Stanley Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28
Rutgers L. Rev. 861, 911 (1975).
77. On the existence of a "community tolerance threshold" in insanity cases, see, e.g.,
Caryl E. Boehnert, Psychological and Demographic Factors Associated With Individuals Using the
Insanity Defense, 13 J. Psychiatry & L. 9, 27-28 (1985) (noting that defendants committing
crimes below the limits of this tolerance level were more readily acquitted by reason of
insanity); Daniel W. Schwartz, The Proper Use of a Psychiatric Expert, in Scientific and Expert
Evidence in Criminal Advocacy 97, 111 (Juris. G. Cederbaums & Selma Arnold eds., 1975)
(observing that the success of insanity plea frequently hinges on defendant's "likeability");
David B. Wexler, An Offense-Victim Approach to Insanity Defense Reform, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 17, 20-23
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it so badly misperceive the empirical realities of criminal sentencing
systems? 7 And, finally, why are perceptions the most erroneous in cases
involving mentally disabled criminal defendants?9
To understand the matter at hand, the roots of the rejection of
psychodynamic principles in criminal justice decisionmaking (as
exemplified by society's attitudes toward the insanity defense plea),
consider the explanation offered byJ.C. Flugel:
In the first place, the criminal provides an outlet for our
(moralized) aggression. In this respect he plays the same role as
do our enemies in war and our political scapegoats in time of
peace... In the second place, the criminal by his flouting of law
and moral rule constitutes a temptation to the id; it is as though
we said to ourselves, "if he does it, why should not we?" This
stirring of criminal impulses within ourselves calls for an
answering effort on the part of the super-ego, which can best
achieve its object by showing that "crime doesn't pay.". .. By
punishing [the criminal] we are not only showing that he can't
"get away with it" but holding him up as a terrifying example to
our own tempted and rebellious selves. Thirdly, and closely
connected with this.., is the danger with which our whole
notion of justice is threatened when we observe that a criminal
goes unpunished. The primitive foundation of this notion ... lies
in an equilibrium of pleasures and pains, of indulgence and
punishment. This equilibrium is disturbed, either if the moral
rewards of good conduct are not forthcoming... or if the
normal punishments of crime are absent or uncertain... It is to
prevent disturbance of the latter kind that we insist that those
who have broken the law shall be duly punished. Through their
punishment the equilibrium is re-established; without it (so we
(1984) (stating that the public disproportionately tolerates the use of the insanity defense in
cases where the victim is a nonstranger, and where the level of community outrage is thus
comparatively lower). See, e.g., Daniel S. Bailis et al., Community Standards of Criminal Liability
and the Insanity Defense, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 425 (1995) (comparing lay standards of
insanity to those standards incorporated in American legal codes); Norman Finkel, Culpability
and CommonsenseJustice: Lessons Learned Betwixt Murder and Madness, 10 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 11 (1996) (noting that community sentiment plays a central if not dispositive
role in cases where the issue is whether a punishment is cruel and unusual).
78. See, e.g., Doob & Roberts, supra note 47 (discussing community opinion regarding
sentencing); Fox et al., supra note 47 (exploring factors which underlie recent trends in
public support for the death penalty); Roberts & Doob, supra note 47 (investigating the
assertion that members of the public are consistently more punitive than judges in
sentencing).
79. See Henry Steadman, Beating a Rap? 17 (1979) (stating that there is an astonishing
dearth of information about those who are found incompetent to stand trial); Henry
Steadman & Joseph Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconception of the Criminally
Insane, 41 Pub. Opin. 523, 531 (1977-78) (presenting the results of a random sample of the
general public, in which the public incorrectly identified such notorious defendants as Patty
Hearst and Charles Manson as being criminally insane, and every person cited as being
criminally insane by poll respondents was an individual who had been charged with murder,
kidnapping, or bombing).
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dimly feel) the whole psycholoical and social structure on which
morality depends is imperiled.8
Another important purpose of punishment stems from the fact that
society's sense of justice is disturbed if its members see another go
unpunished for antisocial or asocial behavior.8' If society fails to punish,
those who wish to violate the law may feel more free to do so, and those
who are law-abiding may lose confidence in the legal system's ability to
enforce the criminal law. 2 The importance of punishing offenders is thus
underscored: law-abiding society has its anti-aggression safety-valve;83 it
projects its guilt, blame, shame, and fear;84 expresses its collective anger
and hostility, and shows the criminal that, like other members of society,
80. Franz Alexander & Hugo Staub, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public 215
(Gregory Zilboorg trans., 1931) ("[T]he louder man calls for the punishment of the
lawbreaker, the less he has to fight against his own repressed impulses."); see, e.g., J.C. Flugel,
Man, Morals and Society 169-70 (1961).
81. See Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24
Criminology 393, 396 (1986) ("The failure to define a transgression as legally and morally
wrong may disturb many law-abiding members of society."); see also Franz Alexander &
Sheldon Selesnick, The History of Psychiatry 352 (1966).
82. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishmen4 65 Tul. L. Rev. 299, 314 (1990).
83. But see Mickenberg, supra note 34, at 960-61 n.66 (1987) (suggesting that "law and
order" sentiments are a pretext, covering retributive personal antipathy toward criminals).
We are somehow not content to say that criminals should be punished because we
hate them and want to hurt them. It has to be because others hate them and would,
were it not for our prudence in providing them with this spectacle, stage a far worse
one of their own. This kind of hypocrisy is endemic in arguments about the death
penalty, but it does not seem to be empirically verified. Lynchings do not, as this
theory would lead us to conclude, seem to increase in places that have abolished
capital punishment.)
Id. (quoting Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 38 (1968)). On the related
question of when punishment is deserved, see Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 Ind. L.J. 719, 759 (1992) ("The
crime control model gave emotional and substantive content to the revival of penal
retaliation.").
84. On the relationship between punishment and guilt, see Lasky, supra note 55, at
("Crime stories constitute the foliage of our collective unconscious, which are the tendrils of
our inner guilt concerning crime.") (quoting Walter Bromberg, Crime and the Mind: A
Psychiatric Analysis of Crime and Punishment (1939)). On blame, see generally Richard
Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245 (1992)
(portraying criminal law as a vital social mechanism by which an intentionalist perspective is
created and maintained). On shame, see Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr.,
Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Mode 24 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 837, 854 (1990) (discussing the impact of shame as a crime deterrent). On fear, see Marc
Ouimet & Edward J. Coyle, Fear of Crime and Sentencing Punitiveness: Comparing the General Public
and Court Practitioners, 32 Can. J. Criminology 149 (1991) (stating that fear of crime has no
impact on citizens's punitiveness, but the perception court practitioners have of the public
fear of crime does impact on their own decisions).
85. SeeJ.C. Flugel, supra note 80, at 150; Sendor, supra note 30 at 1428 ("[Punishment]
expresses the collective anger at issue in retribution."); see also Sendor, supra note 30, at 1428
n.208 ("Punishment is a form of communication to other people as well as to an offender.").
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he cannot succumb to temptation, thereby preserving the notion of an
even-handed justice system. 6 Although both the law-abiding and the
criminal know that only a small percentage of crimes result in arrests (let
alone punishment),87 society continues to retain this notion of a fair
criminal justice system; its schema of fairness is shaken when defendants
who have been arrested and who are on trial appear to evade punishment
for their criminal behavior.
In the context of the insanity defense, these principles seem to reflect
some cognitive dissonance or psychological reactance. 8s If some mentally
ill individuals are deemed to not be criminally culpable, and if society
accepts the notion that some individuals will receive "special treatment"
from the law by reason of their mental disability, such exemptions can exist
only where those selected accurately reflect society's moral judgments that
such special treatment is warranted. 9 This helps to explain why there is
increasing support for relaxing the legal protections available to the
mentally ill, by making them equally subject to the same draconian
penalties now generally in favor."0 It may also explain why so much of the
insanity defense debate is dominated by the fear of defendants faking so as
to "beat the rap." In reality, research shows that offenders often deny
mental illness and its symptomatology, 9' even where recognition of the
86. See generally Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 Minn.
L. Rev. 789, 792 (1967) (discussing the societal need for moral condemnation through
retribution); see also J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 Va. L Rev. 197, 238 (1990)
(prosecutor implicitly suggested to jurors that, "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they
were largely his own fault"); Pillsbury, supra note 83, at 736 (penitentiary satisfied public's
emotional need for "tough and dramatic retaliation against criminals").
87. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1238 n.26 (1985).
88. See Sharon Brehm &Jack Brehm, Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and
Control 30-31 (1981) ("Given that a person believes he or she has a specific freedom, any
force on the individual that makes it more difficult for him or her to exercise the freedom
constitutes a threat to it. Thus, any kind of attempted social influence ... that work[s]
against exercising the freedom can be defined as threats."); see generally Michael L. Perlin,
Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and the Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense, " Heuristic Reasoning
and CognitiveDissonanc4 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 131, 138-39 (1991) (discussing the
effect of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance on mental health reform
legislation). See generally, Perlin, supra note 20 (explaining the tendency of the legal system to
condone and encourage pretextuality and deceit).
89. See Lynnette S. Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects of an Abolition Unsupported by a Moral
Consensus, 9 Am.J.L. & Med. 471, 477-78 (1984) ("[W]hen the standard for according special
treatment reflects society's moral judgment and is correctly implemented, the public will
perceive that the law is just and not easily circumvented.").
90. Lois G. Forer, Law and the Unreasonable Person, 36 Emory L.J. 181, 191 (1987). On the
question of whether we are, in fact, "criminalizing" mental patients, see Arthur J. Lurigio &
Dan A. Lewis, The Criminal Mental Patient: A Descriptive Analysis and Suggestions for Future
Research, 14 Grim. Just. & Behav. 268, 283 (1987) (asserting that there is little empirical
evidence found to support the notion that the mentally ill are being unduly criminalized).
91. See, e.g., Linda S. Grossman & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Do Sex Offenders Minimize
Psychiatric Symptoms? 34 J. Forensic Sci. 881 (1989) (discussing findings that many sex
offenders experience and deny widespread psychiatric symptoms in addition to their sexual
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existence of such symptoms might, literally, save their lives.92
Thus, in analyzing the decision of the legislature in Idaho (an
isolated, highly religious state) to reduce the insanity defense to solely a
consideration of mens rea,93 Geis and Meier found that Idaho residents
strongly held the view that all human beings ought to take personal
responsibility for their behavior.94 As a result the residents concluded that
mentally disabled criminal defendants should not be able to avoid punitive
consequences of criminal acts by reliance on either a "real or faked plea of
insanity."95 This sentiment of the people of Idaho was subsequently
endorsed by a member of the Louisiana Supreme Court 0
These attitudes also create a residual problem: empirical studies have
shown, clearly and consistently, that a significant percentage of offenders
suffer from mental illness, 97 and that the act of incarceration may either
disorders).
92. See, e.g., findings reported in Dorothy Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducationa4
and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 Am. J.
Psychiatry 584, 588 (1988) [hereinafter Lewis, Juveniles] (stating that death row juveniles
"almost uniformly tried to hide evidence of cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms"); and
in Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row
Inmates in the United States, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 838, 841 (1986) [hereinafter Lewis, Inmates]
(stating that all but one of a sample of death row inmates studied attempted to minimize
rather than exaggerate their degree of psychiatric disorders); see also State v. Stevens, 764 P.2d
724, 729 (Ariz. 1988) (evidence showed that 50% of all individuals with certain neurological
lesions would be led "in the direction of anti-social behavior").
93. See 3 Perlin, supra note 12, § 15.41 at 404-06 (discussing insanity defense reform in
the aftermath of the Hinkley acquittal).
94. Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier, Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477
Annals 72, 73 (1985); see also, Balkin, supra note 84, at 238 (discussing view that Hinckley's
emotional problems were "his own fault") (emphasis added).
95. Geis & Meier, supra note 94, at 73 (emphasis added). The authors suggest that the
Idaho legislation might reflect "the response of the uneasy good against the acting-out
wicked"
[T]here exist in all of us impulses toward wickedness that we suppress at some
cost. As a reward for our suppression, we would like to make certain that those who
have not forced themselves to repress their evil impulses suffer suitably for that lapse
so we ourselves can be reassured that our sacrifice was not for nothing.
Id. at 77. Cf Henry Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 38
Tex. L. Rev. 849, 861 (1960) (stating that frequent requests for psychiatric assistance is often
seen as evidence of malingering).
96. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("Society has
the right to protect itself from those who would commit murder and seek to avoid their
legitimate punishment by a subsequently contracted, or feigned, insanity.").
97. See, e.g., Anasseril E. Daniel & Phillip W. Harris, Female Offenders Referred for Pre-Trial
Psychiatric Evaluation, 9 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 40, 46 (1979) (stating that over 90% of
referred female offenders are found to have at least one "recognizable psychiatric condition");
Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Petrusson, Changing Characteristics of Homicide in Ireland 26 Med. Sci. &
L. 299 (1986) (stating that 2/3 of offenders were considered mentally abnormal); Michael L.
Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?", 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1987) (stating that the
percentage of death row inmates with serious psychiatric problems is "staggeringly high,")
(discussing Lewis, Inmates, supra note 92, at 842).
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exacerbate underlying psychiatric conditions or precipitate mental illness
in vulnerable individuals. 98 To some extent, this percentage, which
absorbs mental health and criminal justice resources "at an alarming
pace,"9'  includes defendants unable to avail themselves of a
nonresponsibility defense who are subsequently imprisoned. 00  This
"overlapping clientele"' of individuals-often "twice-cursed" 0 2  as
"mad and bad" °0-- will inevitably increase as judicial hostility toward the
insanity defense and insanity defense pleaders increases, fueled by the
punitive spirit that sparks the "negative pattern of fear and repression" that
once again dominates penology.' ° It is this spirit that best exemplifies
our "culture of punishment." 05
98. See Herschel Prins, Mental Abnormality and Criminali -An Uncertain Relationship, 30
Med., Sci. & L. 247, 248-49 (1990).
99. Lurigio & Lewis, supra note 90, at 282. A symposium at an American Psychological
Association's yearly conference was thus provocatively entitled, "The Nation's Largest
Psychiatric Hospital-Los Angeles CountyJail" (August, 1990, San Francisco, CA).
100. On the implications of recent adoptions of the guilty but mentally ill verdict for this
population, see 3 Perlin, supra note 12, § 15.09, at 307-13 (discussing the development of this
defense in over a dozen jurisdictions).
101. Hans Toch & Kenneth Adams, In the Eye of the Beholder? Assessments of Psychopatholoy
Among Prisoners By Federal Prison Staff, 24J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 119 (1987) (discussing Linda
Teplin, Mental Health and Criminal Justice (1984)).
102. Ellen Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendan 14 Crim.
Just. & Behav. 251, 252 (1987).
103. Herschel A. Prins, Mad or Bad-Thoughts on the Equivocal Relationship Between Mental
Disorder and Criminality, 3 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 421 (1980); see generally June Resnick German
& Anne C. Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Found Not Guilty By Reason
of Insanity, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 1011, 1074 (1976) ("No group of patients has been more
deprived of treatment, discriminated against, or mistreated than persons acquitted of crimes
on grounds of insanity.").
104. See Robert J. Menzies, Cycles of Control The Transcarceral Careers of Forensic Patients, 10
Int'l J.L, & Psychiatry 233, 246 (1987) (describing the "mutual encroachment of legal and
medical systems of penalty").
Forensic patients are highly accessible targets for both medical and legal
intervention. Like criminal defendants generally, individuals facing psychiatric
assessment are typically dependent, dispossessed, powerless people... who are "put
into order" ... by a system over which they exercise little knowledge or control.
They are the semi- or pre-institutionalized populations.., who are immersed within
the expanding web of welfare, justice, and mental health, and whose deviant careers
repeatedly penetrate into this triadic system of supervision and constraint. At the
frontier between law and medicine, forensic patients become the subjects of a
control display in which parallel agencies mutually reinforce each other's capacity to
promote order.
Id. at 233 (citations omitted).
105. The closest prior use I have found of this phrase is in Todd Clear, The Punishment
Addiction: Twenty Years of Compulsive Punishment Lifestyle, in National Conference on Sentencing
Advocacy 55, 56 (1989) ("Our culture suffers from a punishment addiction.").
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III. AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6
A. Introduction
The need for punishment is only part of the explanation of the
discrepancy between public perception and the realities of the insanity
defense. Indeed, the need for punishment is only part of society's psyche,
its personality. A more complete understanding of the complexities of
society's personality provides further explanation of the discrepancy.
1. Authoritarian Personality Theory
Sociologists, political scientists and psychologists have developed a
theoretical construct to describe individuals who reflect an "authoritarian
personality."0 7 Responding to the hypothesis that "the political,
economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and
coherent pattern, as if bound together by a 'mentality' or 'spirit,' and that
this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality,"'03
T.W. Adorno and his colleagues first conceived of the authoritarian
personality to characterize an individual whose behavior was marked by a
bundle of personality traits:
dominance of subordinates; deference toward superiors; sensitivity
to power relationships; need to perceive the world in a highly
structured fashion; excessive use of stereotypes; and adherence to
whatever values are conventional in one's setting.'09
An authoritarian personality-type 0 is intolerant of ambiguity and is
106. This section is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 19, at 369-75.
107. The classic work is Theodore Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1982) (1950). Authoritarian personality has generated the most widely used
typology of political personality available. See generally Michael Lerner, A Bibliographical Note in
Fred I. Greenstein, Personality & Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptual-
ization 154, 167-178 (1975) (discussing authoritarian studies). While it has been critiqued
vigorously, see for example, Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian
Personality" (Richard Christie & Marie Jahoda eds., 1954) and M. Brewster Smith, Review of
The Authoritarian Personality by T.W Adorno, et al., 45J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 775 (1950)
(book review), and while important methodological errors have been uncovered, see for
example, Greenstein, supra, at 100-02, 114-16, authoritarian personality remains a valuable
construct for explaining both the roots of political psychology and the significance of
personality on political beliefs.
108. Adorno et al., supra note 107, at 1. Adorno's work is cited in, inter alia, Crawford v.
Bounds, 395 F. 2d 297, 314 (4th Cir. 1968).
109. Greenstein, supra note 107, at 104. See, e.g., J. Kirscht & R. Dillehay, Dimensions of
Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory 35-69 (1967); Robert Nisbet, Prejudices: A
Philosophical Dictionary 18-22 (1982) (defining authoritarianism).
110. Later researchers have described two theories of authoritarian personalities: the "ego-
defensive" theory (the authoritarian personality covers his feelings of personal weakness with a
"facade of toughness," through a combination of the ego defenses of repression and reaction
formation which leave his emotional capacities stunted), and the "cognitive" theory (the
authoritarian personality's behavior patterns stem from the learning of a reality prevalent in
one's individual subculture). Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Political Socialization: The
Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character, 361 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 81, 88-
89 (1965). Research is compatible with both or either underlying theory. See id. at 89 n.24
1394 82 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1997]
made uncomfortable by disorder."' In response to subtle and complex
phenomenon, he imposes his own tight categories upon them, thus
making "more than the usual use of stereotypes."" 2 Perhaps more subtly,
he is "preoccupied with virility," tending toward "exaggerated assertion of
strength and toughness,""13 and is frequently unable to be introspec-
tive." '4 He demands obedience to rules and insists on conformity, and is
willing to rely on coercion and punishment to enforce that obedience." 5
Authoritarians have difficulty in accepting impulses they consider
deviant: "fear, weakness, sex and aggression,"" 6 and greater difficulty in
expressing empathy." 7 It is thus no surprise that authoritarians are
particularly intolerant of psychodynamic explanations of human behavior,
nor that a major study of attitudes about mental illness concluded that, "in
a community climate characterized by an authoritarian social-political
structure, we can expect to find authoritarian and socially restrictive
attitudes toward the mentally ill.,
11 8
Authoritarian traits are frequently exhibited by individuals
characterized as "rigid, racist, anti-Semitic, sexually repressed, [and]
politically conservative .... who will accept the word of an authority figure
over that of a lesser person."" 9 Attitudes toward crime control, due
process and legal punishment are also positively linked to authoritarianism,
(citing Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter 512-15 (1960) as a source of "recent
research"); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A
Cross-National Comparison, 2J. Conflict Resol. 29 (1958) (studying sociocultural factors as they
relate to prejudice).
111. See Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual
Personality Variable, 18J. Personality 108 (1949); Greenstein, supra note 107, at 86.
112. Greenstein, supra note 107, at 86. See generally Perlin, supra note 19, at 377 n.18.
113. Greenstein, supra note 107, at 87. On the relationship between hypermasculinity, the
authoritarian personality, and homophobia, see Michael S. Kimmel, Issues for Men in the 1990s,
46 U. Miami L. Rev. 671, 681 (1992).
114. Id. Cf Emanuel Tanay, Psychodynamic Differentiations of Homicide, 6 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 364, 365-66 (1978) (ego-dystonic murderers-whose homicides occur "against
the conscious wishes of the perpetrator"-reflect characteristics of an "agressiphobic
personality," including rigidity, moralism, and being "highly conflicted about their own
aggressive strivings").
115. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 Ind. LJ. 379, 382 (1991).
116. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 343, 372 (1991).
117. On empathy, see generally, Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact
Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996).
118. Stephen Ducat, Taken In: American Gullibility and the Reagan Mythos 64 n. *
(1988). See also David Levine, A Cross-National Study of Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, 80 J.
Abnormal Psychol. 111, 111 (1972) (linking a community's opinions about mental illness and
the socio-political climate).
119. John B. McConahay et al., The Uses of Social Science in Trals with Political and Racial
Overtones: The Trial ofJoan Little, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 205, 217 (1977). But see Raymond
J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 413-414
(1992) (criticizing this characterization-when used as a tool in jury selection-as contrary to
the "legal and political structure of a pluralistic democracy").
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and legal verdicts reflect juror authoritarianism in assessments of
defendants' guilt. 20
2. Authoritarianism and Public Opinion
One of the recurrent themes in insanity defense literature is the
peculiar role of public opinion in shaping judicial policy.' The Hinckley
trial loosed a torrent of public criticism rarely equaled in contemporane-
ous trials:
Separate streams of public opinion-outrage over the courts'
perceived "softness on crime"; outrage over a jurisprudential
system that could even allow a defendant who shot the President
in cold blood (on national television) to plead "not guilty" (by
any reason); outrage at a jurisprudential system that counte-
nanced obfuscatory and confusing testimony by competing teams
of psychiatrists as to the proper characterization of a defendant's
mental illness; in short, the outrage over the "abuse" of the
insanity defense-became a river of fury after the NGRI verdict
was announced'22
In considering the impact of public opinion on the shaping of
insanity defense jurisprudence, it is necessary to consider the impact on
public opinion of two important forces: the media and governmental
officials. Here, the record is definitive: the public's distorted view of the
insanity defense and its impacts is a direct result of misinformation
disseminated by both media and official sources.
Researchers have demonstrated that the public grossly overestimates
both the frequency and the success rate of the insanity defense plea. This
overestimation is a product of the media publicity accorded to certain
notorious criminal cases, virtually none of which involved defendants
120. Herman E. Mitchell & Donn Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects ofJurors' Attitudes
and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 123 (1973) (studying
the effects of psychological variable on decision); Julie A. Weir & Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
The Determinants of Mock Jurors' Verdicts in a Rape Case, 20 J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 901, 903-04
(1990) (linking the authoritarian personality to juror decisions); Gary Schumacher, Measuring
Attitudes Toward Crime Control paper presented at the American Psychological Association
annual conference, San Francisco, CA (August 1991); Neil Vidmar & Dale T. Miller,
Socialpsychological Processes Underlying Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment, 14 L. & Soc'y Rev. 565
(1980); Douglas Narby et al., A Meta-analysis of the Association Between Authoritarianism and
Jurors' Perceptions of Defendant Culpability, paper presented at the American Psychological
Association annual conference, San Francisco, CA (August 1991).
121. See Susan N. Herman, The Insanity Defense in Fact and Fiction: On Norval Morris's
Madness and the Criminal Law, 1985 Am. B. Found. Res.J. 385, 392 ("Morris's argument against
the insanity defense relies in part on a sense that decent community reaction favors abolition.
As is generally true, community reaction colors the discussion of the defense without being
subjected to close examination.") (emphasis added).
122. Perlin, supra note 29, at 859 (footnote omitted). On perceptions ofjudicial leniency
in general, see Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay
Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing. Misperception and Discontent, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 199
(1990).
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actually found NGRV23 Although the extent to which mass media
representations distorted the prevalence and symptomatology of mental
illness was first articulated over thirty years ago by J.D. Nunnally,'24 it was
not until Steadman and Cocozza published their study in 1978 that the
earlier media critique grew to encompass the criminally insane.as
The Hinckley trial further exacerbated this distortion. The media's
interest in the defense helped to legitimatize long-standing movements to
abolish or shrink the defense. 1 21 In the trial's wake, the National
Commission on the Insanity Defense specified that the public's perceptions
were largely formed by "selective news reporting," and patiently rebutted
each of the myths that media miscoverage helped to perpetuate. 27
In addition, the nation's political leaders perpetuate insanity defense
myths by appealing to society's "emotionality and impulsive change."
28
Officials of both the Nixon and Reagan Administrations regularly used the
insanity defense as the whipping boy for a host of unrelated criminal
justice and social problems. Using heuristic reasoning and appealing to
alleged ordinary common sense, they painted a false picture of the insanity
defense, its role in the criminal justice system, and its impact on public
safety.
Shaped in significant part by these distortions, public opinion has a
significant impact on insanity defense jurisprudence.'2 Professor Susan
Herman noted this phenomenon and argued that, while public opinion
may be an appropriate determinant for some insanity defense
decisionmaking,50 it is inappropriate for other aspects: if the public
123. In their classic study, Henry Steadman and Joseph Cocozza asked respondents to list
criminally insane persons. Although 42% named at least one individual in response to this
inquiry, none of the persons listed had actually been found NGRI. Steadman & Cocozza, supra
note 77, at 528. On the gap between public perception and reality, see, Bailis et al., supra note
75, at 425-26; Karen E. Whittemore & James R.P. Ogloff, Factors That Influence Jury Decision
Making. Disposition Instructions and Mental State at the Time of the Trial 19 Law & Hum. Behav.
283, 284-45 (1995).
124. J.D. Nunnally, Popular Conceptions of Mental Health (1961); see also Thomas Scheff,
Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory 67-80 (1966).
125. Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 79, at 532.
126. Peter Arenella, Reflections on Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the Insanity Defense 8
Am. J.L. & Med. 271, 272 (1982) ("By rekindling public hostililty and media interest, the
Hinckley verdict helped legitimize long-standing efforts at both the state and federal levels to
abolish or reform the defense."); see generally Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate
Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 63, 65 (1994) (discussing the media's
power to influence public perception of the insanity defense).
127. See David B. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 528, 537
(1985) (discussing National Mental Health Ass'n, Myths and Realities: A Report of the
National Commission on the Insanity Defense 14-23 (1983)).
128. Randy G. Lagrone & Don C. Combs, Alternatives to the Insanity Defense, 12J. Psychiatry
& L. 93, 96 (1984).
129, But see Donald J. Hall, The Insanity Defense: Thumbs Down to Wexler's "Offense-Victim"
Limitation, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 329, 329-30 (1985) (questioning whether public opinion is an
appropriate measuring device for continued use of the insanity defense).
130. See Herman, supra note 121, at 398.
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wished to abandon moral blameworthiness (and to substitute factual guilt,
the actus reus, as an underpinning for criminal liability), then "the
defenders of the insanity defense would be in trouble." 'S'
Society's social ambivalence about the use of psychiatry as a tool of
social control is ironic. Where inaccurate predictions support lengthier
detentions, they are privileged; where they may lead to the earlier release
of an individual who has the potential of committing a subsequent violent
act, they are intolerable. The constant is the desire for a settled social
order. The uncertainty that would result from contrary use of psychiatric
expertise, expertise that might add "gray" tones to questions that could
otherwise be answered in black and white, is rejected because it is
dissonant with the authoritarian intolerance of ambiguity.
13 2
3. Authoritarianism and the Insanity Defense
Authoritarians hold harshly punitive attitudes toward those who do
not comply with the law,'33 and "condemn, reject, and punish people
who violate conventional values." 14 The insanity defense by its own terms
exculpates those who do not comply with criminal statutes, and, frequently,
this noncompliance is exhibited in non-conventional ways. It should not be
surprising that the authoritarians' distrust of difference is especially
marked in their dealing with insanity defense issues.
Research confirms the "enduring pattern of public animosity to the
insanity plea. " '3' Conviction proneness in death penalty cases is revealed
in many ways by an individual's attitudes toward the legitimacy of the
insanity defense, 36 and toward the perception whether the defense is "a
loophole allowing too many guilty [people] to go free."' 3' Upon
reviewing the literature, Professor Ellsworth and her colleagues labeled the
finding that death penalty and insanity defense attitudes are related as a
"robust one."' Perhaps research that reveals that a pro-death penalty
131. Id. at 397.
132. The opportunity to exercise authority influences some individuals to accept low-
paying jobs as "gatekeepers" in psychiatric emergency facilities. See Rosalyn Tolbert, Decision
Making in Psychiatric Emergencies: A Phenomenological Analysis of Gatekeeping, 17 J. Community
Psychol. 471, 47-48 (1989).
133. See Henderson, supra note 115, at 394 (stating that authoritarians demand compliance
with the law simply by virtue of its status as law).
134. Adorno et al., supra note 107, at 157 (defining authoritarian agression).
135. Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defens4 24
Criminology 393, 394 (1986) (noting that although there is negativity toward the insanity plea,
little is known about the reason for such a reaction).
136. See Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-
Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7 n.32 (1970); see
also Harry Kalven,Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 330 (1966) (such response may reveal
willingness to violate the law to convict "bad men," lack of regard for a legitimate legal
defense, or an unsympathetic posture on the scope of moral or criminal responsibility).
137. Bronson, supra note 136, at 7.
138. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 Law
& Hum. Behav. 81, 83 (1984) (referring to surveys which found that people against capital
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attitude is correlated with a high level of "resentment of outgroups" helps
further explain this link; after all, what group is more of an "outgroup"
than insanity defense pleaders?"'9
This animosity toward outgroups is especially evident among jurors.
Studies indicate jurors who favor the death penalty are much more likely
to reject the insanity defense than jurors who oppose the death
penalty." ' Nonetheless, other research reveals that
where the defense of insanity was based on a physical disease or
defect, there was no difference between [the views of] death-
qualified and excludable jurors. The distinction in the minds of
the jurors is striking. In part it may reflect the public's generally
greater hostility towards the mentally ill than towards people with
other types of disease or handicap, including mental retarda-
tion,'"  but, in part it probably also reflects a particular
resentment against the idea of a purely mental problem as an
excuse for unacceptable behavior. To a person who believes
strongly in crime control, who believes that people must be made
to pay for their irresponsible behavior, it must be particularly
galling to see one form of irresponsibility excused by another. A
physical disorder may be seen as external to the person, creating
a sort of necessity or duress, but a purely mental disorder may be
seen as simply another manifestation of a weak or corrupted
character.4
2
In simulated studies, mock jurors offer three primary reasons for
rejecting insanity defenses: "mental illness is no excuse; [the defendant]
might have fooled the psychiatrist; [the defendant] should have sought
help for his problems."'43 These findings are consistent with other
punishment were more likely to acquit by reason of insanity); see also People v. Williams, 558
N.E.2d 1258, 1268 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (rejecting defendant's argument based on the article by
Ellsworth and her colleagues that excusing jurors opposed to the death penalty resulted in a
jury "organized to convict [the defendant) because of its opposition to the insanity defense").
On the relationship between death penalty verdicts and fact-finders' assessments of
mental disability evidence, see Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden'.
The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 201 (1996).
139. See Jonathan Kelley & John Braithwaite, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty in
Australia, 7Just. Q. 529, 530 (1990) ("The idea is that criminals are an outgroup ... and that
there is a general predisposition toward persecution of outgroups which includes support for
capital punishment.").
140. See Ellsworth et al., supra note 138, at 83, 90, 92 (discussing the attitudinal differences
among individuals when judging insane defendants).
141. John L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4 J. Special Educ.
295 (1970).
142. Ellsworth et al., supra note 138, at 90; see also Lawrence T. White, The Mental Illness
Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 Behav. Sci. & L. 411, 417 (1987) (noting that an
insanity defense is more likely to succeed when supported with "objective" evidence of
psychopathology).
143. Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of
Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 113, 125 (1987). Conversely, Professor
White found that an insanity defense had a greater chance of success where defense counsel
"could establish that (1) the defendant has not "fooled" the examining psychiatrist... and
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research demonstrating that jurors with unfavorable attitudes toward
psychiatry appear to have "a more basic approach to the relationship
between crime and punishment."' According to criminal defense
attorney Norman Zalkind, insanity defense case jurors employ "almost a
kind of quasi-religious view that you're responsible for your acts."'45
There is a clear fit between the retribution-driven punitive response
favored by authoritarians and their resentment of the insanity defense and
general hostility toward psychiatry.1 46 This should not be surprising, given
authoritarians' propensity to endorse punishment as an end in itself;
47
by its very nature, the insanity defense allows certain mentally impaired
criminal defendants-frequently perceived as morally deviant-to escape
punishment.148 Similarly, eighty-two percent of surveyed death penalty
retentionists endorsed the proposition that a capital punishment advantage
is that it "makes it impossible for convicted murderers to later go free on
account of some legal technicality." 149 When we factor in additional
research revealing that legislators who attribute crime to "free will" support
capital punishment more strongly than do those who attribute it to social
factors,'50 another piece of the puzzle is filled in. Believers in free will are
often precisely those who reject mental disability as a causal explanation
(2) the defendant had previously sought help for his illness." Id. at 125 n.11, for the raw data
reported, see id. at 124.
In his study, White found that mock jurors identified a defendant's mental illness both
as a reason for giving a life sentence (e.g., thirteen respondents indicated "(d]efendant is
mentally ill; cannot be held completely responsible for his actions") and for choosing the
death penalty (e.g., eight stated "mental illness is no excuse;" seven stated "defendant is not
crazy; could have fooled psychiatrist;" and six stated that "[d]efendant did not seek help for
his problems."). Id. At 124 (referring to Tables 5-6).
144. Ibtihaj Arafat & Kathleen McCahery, The Insanity Defense and the Juror, 22 Drake L.
Rev. 538, 549 (1973).
145. Brian MacQuarrie, Insanity Defense: Rarely Used and Rarely Victorious, Boston Globe, Feb.
29, 1996, at 1.
146. See e.g., Ralph Brancale, More on McNaghten: A Psychiatrist's Irew, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 277,
279 (1961) ("Let us not delude ourselves that we have accorded the defendant a fair
consideration through due process of law and have weighed all the moral and psychologic
issues involved. We are seeking the extermination of a dangerous person and we are seeking
revenge."); Vidmar & Miller, supra note 120, at 591.
147. See Vidmar & Miller, supra note 120, at 591.
148. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, "Plain Crazy:" Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity, 7
Int'lJ.L & Psychiatry 105, 110 (1984) (public opinion polls have consistently shown a majority
of Americans believe the insanity defense is a "loophole that allows too many guilty people to
go free"); Jonas R. Rappeport, The Insanity Plea Scapegoating the Mentally Ill-Much Ado About
Nothing? 24 S. Tex. LJ. 687, 690 (1983) ("The insanity plea offers an opportunity to soften
some of the harshness of our criminal justice system ... ."); White, supra note 141, at 124-26
(jurors who are primarily concerned with efficient crime control are likely to reject insanity
plea, while those primarily concerned with due process are more likely to accept a plea).
149. Phoebe Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 Crime & Delinq. 116, 156 (1983).
150. Francis T. Cullen et al., Attribution, Salience, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Sanctioning
12 Crim. Just. & Behav. 305, 322-26 (1985); Mark Hamm, Legislator Ideology and Capital
Punishment: The Special Case for Indiana Juveniles, 6 Just. Q. 219, 220 (1989).
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for criminal behavior; this rejection may well stem from the same
behavioral and cognitive sources as do the related death penalty attitudes.
It is clear that much public opinion about the insanity defense is
imperfect and uninformed. Further, insanity defense attitudes, like death
penalty attitudes, are laden with symbolism. They are "almost wholly
abstract, ideological, and symbolic in nature, with essentially no personal
relevance to the individual.""" These abstracted attitudes are expressed
not only by lay people but by experts as well. Professors Homant and
Kennedy have demonstrated that expert witnesses' previously articulated
general attitudes toward the insanity defense would significantly govern
their determination as to insanity in an individual hypothetical case.'5 2
The insanity defense is the authoritarian's worst-case disaster fantasy.
It explicitly states that certain individuals can break the rules; what is
worse, the rule breakers are definitionally deviant: they are individuals not
"like us," outgroup members whose very essence appears to be a rejection
of the conformity values most prized by the authoritarian personality. To
the authoritarian, the insanity defense condones, indeed, rewards, the
deviant for flaunting the law, and the defense refuses to force such an
individual to take responsibility for his actions. The insanity defense
thwarts the administration of punishment and does so with judicial
sanction.
This perhaps helps explain why society adheres to insanity defense
myths in spite of the overwhelming weight of contrary empirical evidence;
psychologically, the dissonance that would be caused by acknowledging the
mythic basis of insanity defense beliefs is more than the social psyche can
bear. It may also explain why society adheres to the use of heuristic
cognitive devices when evaluating information about the insanity defense,
and why it refuses to concede that common sense may simply not be a
sufficient explanation for the complex problems under discussion.
IV. ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE'
A. Introduction
Anthropologists study culture; they study the form and structure of
culture; they study the content of culture.' s Anthropologists study
attitudes-social attitudes, cultural attitudes and political attitudes.' 55 And
they study myths.'56
151. Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 149, at 164.
152. See Robert Homant & Daniel Kennedy, Determinants in Expert Witnesses' Opinions in
Insanity Defense Cases, in Courts and Criminal Justice: Emerging Issues 57, 73-74 (L. Talerico
ed., 1985) ("[A] ttitude toward the insanity defense in general was a powerful predictor of how
subjects judged [a] particular case . . ").
153. This section is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 12, at 13-16.
154. See Richard M. Merelman, On Culture and Politics in America: A Perspective from Structural
Anthropology, 19 Brit.J. Pol. Sci. 465, 472 (1989).
155. See id. at 470.
156. See Douglas Mossman, Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, andi the Myth of Psychiatric
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The study of attitudes and myths is particularly relevant to this article. It is
utterly impossible to understand the politics of insanity defense
jurisprudence without understanding the social and cultural attitudes that
drive legislative and judicial decisionmaking. It is also impossible to
understand this phenomenon without understanding the social and
cultural myths that drive the behavioral and empirical myths. 7
What is as important as the existence and universality of insanity defense
myths is the firmness of society's belief in them as objective realities. Every
civilization, according to Claude IAvi-Strauss, "tends to overestimate the
objective orientation of its thought, and this tendency is never absent."'s
So it is with the insanity defense.
Just as "madness" has specific cultural meanings,"9 just as psychiatric
disease can be seen as a cultural and historical product of Western
biomedicine," ° and just as cultural factors affect the course of major
mental illness,'6 ' attitudes toward the insanity defense have such
meanings and affect the course of treatment (and the ultimate disposition)
of the case of an insanity-pleading offender. Explanatory models of the
insanity defense plea and pleaders have the same function as explanatory
models of sickness. Both are "sets of generalizations which enable the
thinker to produce information about particular sickness episodes and
events."' 6 2
The importance of anthropology to the development of an
understanding of the insanity defense becomes even clearer when the
Abandonment: A Structural Anthropology Perspective, 44 Soc. Sci. & Med. 71, 71 (1997) (quoting E.
Leach, Anthropological Approaches to the Study of the Bible During the Twentieth Centuy, in
Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth 7, 8 (Edmund Leach & D. Alan Aycock eds.,
1983)).
157. The word "myth" is used in the same manner that many social anthropologists use it:
"a sacred tale about past [or present) events which is used to justify social action in the
present." Id.
158. Claude Ievi-Strauss, The Savage Mind 3 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. trans., 1966).
159. See Horacio Fabrega, Jr., Culture and Psychiatric Illness: Biomedical and Ethnomedical
Aspects, in Cultural Conceptions of Mental Health and Therapy 39, 45 (AnthonyJ. Marsella &
Geoffrey M. White eds., 1982) [hereinafter Fabrega 1]; Horacio Fabrega, Jr., Psychiatric Stigma
in the Classical and Medieval Period: A Review of the Literature, 31 Comprehensive Psychiatry 289
(1990) (identifying cultural meanings of schizophrenia); Horacio Fabrega, Jr., The Self and
Schizophrenia: A Cultural Perspective, 15 Schizophrenia Bull. 277 (1989).
160. Horacio Fabrega, Jr., The Concept of Somatization as a Cultural and Historical Product of
Western Medicine, 52 Psychosomatic Med. 653 (1990); Horacio Fabrega, Jr., The Role of Culture in
a Theory of Psychiatric Illness, 35 Soc. Sci. Med. 91, 97 (1992); Nancy E. Waxier, Culture and
Mental Illness: A Social Labeling Perspective, 159J. Nervous & Mental Disease 379 (1974).
161. Horacio Fabrega, Jr., An Ethnomedical Perspective of Medical Ethics% 15 J. Med. & Phil.
593 (1990); Horacio Fabrega, Jr., Cultural Relativism and Psychiatric Illness, 177 J. Nervous &
Mental Dis. 415 (1989); Fabrega I, supra note 157, at 51; Horacio Fabrega, Jr., Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A Cultural Perspective, 175J. Nervous & Mental Disease 383 (1987); Horacio Fabrega,
Jr., The Culture and Histo7y of Psychiatric Stigma in Early Modern and Modern Western Societies: A
Review of Recent Literature, 32 Comprehensive Psychiatry 97 (1991);
162. Allan Young, When Rational Men Fall Sick: An Inquiry Into Some Assumptions Made by
Medical Anthropologists, 5 Culture Med. & Psychiatry 317, 319 (1981).
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inquiry is narrowed to the school of structural anthropology. Structural
anthropologists believe that all culture consists of sets of concepts that are
in psychological tension with each other. For instance, it is impossible to
make sense of black without realizing that it contrasts with white; it is
impossible to understand citizenship without understanding that it
contrasts with alienage.6 Consider how Richard Merelman characterizes
this:
Such narratives appear in myths, rituals, popular culture,
ceremonies or even institutionalized behaviour in which
exemplary persons (heroes, villains, etc.) . .-. depict components
of the sets themselves. In effect, such persons 'act out,' 'display,'
or 'exercise' the culture.
Building on these insights in a recent article, Douglas Mossman looks
at the way society constructs mentally ill persons, specifically mentally ill
homeless persons:
This... helps us appreciate how mentally ill persons...
are ambiguous, perplexing, figures in the context of present day
American political culture. American legal institutions ascribe to
persons a high level of autonomy, personal responsibility and
rationality. These qualities mirror the attributes-independence
and the capacity for conscientious choice-through which
mythologized individuals express their natural goodness amidst
corrupting social influences. [Because of changes in involuntary
civil commitment laws and state hospital funding, m]entally ill
homeless persons are now free to reject society's norms, [and] to
make unwise decisions about their life styles . . . [S]uch behavior
.. reflects unconventional and therefore troubling choices.
Mentally ill homeless persons thus represent a set of culturally
contextual contradictions, because their behavior violates the set
of structural oppositions that Americans use to organize their
social perceptions.'65
Think, in this context, about the insanity defense, about its roots,
about society's attitudes. Think about how society structures good and evil,
well and sick, lawful and unlawful, sane and insane. And think about the
way that, on one hand, the existence of an insanity defense satisfies the
need to express such tensions, but on the other hand creates a tension that
may simply be "too much" for the legal system's "tensile strength."
B. The New Research
It is also useful to observe the myths that society uses to justify its
juxtaposition of fact and emotion, and to consider the ways in which these
myths fit into the structural anthropological model. In order to develop a
better understanding of this fit, I have, over the past two years, conducted
163. Mereman, supra note 154, at 473.
164. Id. at 477.
165. Mossman, supra note 156, at 76.
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a daily computer search for the words "insanity defense" in the NEWS
library of the NEXIS database on the LEXIS system.
The database reveals few surprises. According to the news media, the
allegedly "popular" insanity defense'6--nothing more than a "legalistic
slight of hand" 6 7 and a "common feature of murder defenses" t--is a
reward to mentally disabled defendants for "staying sick," 69 a "traves-
ty,170 a "loophole,"7 1  a "refuge,"'7 a "technicality,"'7 one of the
"absurdities of state law,"'174 perhaps a "monstrous fraud."' 75 It is
used-again, allegedly-in cases involving "mild disorders or a sudden
disappointment or mounting frustrations... or a less-than-perfect
childhood."'176 It is reflected in "pseudoscience [that] can only obfuscate
the issues," 7 7 and is seen as responsible for "burying the traditional
Judeo-Christian notion of moral responsibility under a tower of
psychobabble." 78 Other references to Christianity abound-a letter to
the editor made this analogy:
Christ had the courage and felt a sense of outrage to drive
the money changers from the temple. Will we have the fortitude
to admonish the lawyers to back off and to stop getting killers
acquitted, especially by the insanity defense?'7
Society is simply overwhelmingly skeptical about the use of the
insanity defense in virtually any case.'8 "If everything is forgivable, then
166. Jihad Ai-Khazen, The Beirut Syndrome, Moneyclips, Dec. 12, 1994.
167. Editorial, Insanity Defense on Trial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1995, at 6B.
168. John Taylor, A Nation of Victims: America's Mind-Set: Don't Blame Me For What I've Done,
Mem. Com. Appeal, July 14, 1991, at 34.
169. Jim Gogek & Ed Gogek, Why the Public Hates the Insanity Defense, LA. Daily J., Jan. 5,
1995.
170. Rod Williams, The Logic Is Very Clear, Hous. Chron., Feb. 10, 1995, at 31.
171. Rod Overton, Talk of Legal Insanity Law Resufaces; To Close Loophole in Legal System,
Greensboro (N.C.) News & Rec., Aug. 14, 1994 at Al. On the use of "loophole" language in
this context, see Silver et al., supra note 126, at 65.
172. Karen Fernau, Tough Law Makes Pleading Insanity Harder to Prove; Killers Face Roadblock
in Questfor Freedom, Phoenix Gazette, May 16, 1994, at Al.
173. Thomas Sowell, Insanity Defense Subverts Justice, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1994,
at 7B.
174. Editorial, Sanity on Insanity, Boston Globe, Apr. 1, 1994, at 18 (quoting Massachusetts
Secretary of State Michael Connolly).
175. John Angelotta, Insanity Not a Scientific Term, Clev. Plain Dealer, Apr. 14, 1994, at lB.
176. Philip Terzian, Is Colin Ferguson Insane? Not Enough to Duck Prison, Rocky Mm. News,
Mar. 28, 1995, at 27A.
177. Fran Trotter, Lorena Bobbitt-Allowing Pseudo-Science in Courts Complicates Issues Being
Addressed, Seattle Times, Jan. 30, 1994, at B5 (letter to editor).
178. Joseph Sorrentino, Invasion of the White Coats: Psychology 'Experts' Assail Idea That People
Are Responsible for Their Actions, LA. DailyJ., Feb. 4, 1994.
179. Robert Hall, Criminals Taking Advantage of Christian Love, Buff. News, Jan. 30, 1994, at
8 (letter to editor).
180. See Silver et al., supra note 126, at 64 (citing that studies indicate the public perceives
the insanity defense as a "loophole"); see, e.g., Eve Zibart, The Medea Syndrome: Women Who
Murler Their Young Cosmopolitan, Aug. 1996, at 176.
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everything is permissible," reasoned a recent column in an Orlando
newspaper.' When it is pled, successful defendants are perceived either
as spending a "short time" in mental hospitals (before being released to
unsupervised freedom), or as being simply "set free," 's or, most
often, "getting away with it."'8 ' Defendants' criminal responsibility is still
being assessed by visual frames of reference: if he didn't "seem
frenzied"1"" or appear insane, then "there's no craziness here."8 6 And
of course, the Dan White "Twinkie defense" continues to be seen as some
kind of norm in insanity cases."
Of course, the statistics belie the myths. All empirical analyses are
consistent: the public at large and the legal profession (especially
legislators) dramatically and grossly overestimate both the frequency and
the success rate of the insanity plea, an error "undoubtedly ... abetted" by
media distortions. '8 The most recent research reveals, for instance, that
the insanity defense is used in only about one percent of all felony cases,
and is successful just about one-quarter of the time.'89 The use of the
defense is not limited to murder cases; in one jurisdiction where the data
has been closely studied, contrary to expectations, slightly less than one-
third of the successful insanity pleas entered over an eight-year period were
reached in cases involving a victim's death.'l Further, individuals who
plead insanity in murder cases are no more successful in being found
181. Clarence Page, Editiorial, Sony Results of Blaming Society Instead of People, Orlando
Sentinel, Mar. 24, 1994, at A13.
182. See Cameron McWhirter, Ohio's Insane Criminals Serve Short Terms; 45% Released From
Custody Since 1988, Cin. Enquirer, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al.
183. See Roger Simon, Was Lorena Bobbitt's Act 'An Irresistible Impulre', Bait. Sun, Jan. 12,
1994, at 2A (explaining that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity is set free after
being cured).
184. See, e.g., Dan Aucoin, On TriaL. The Insanity Defense, Boston Globe, Mar. 24, 1996, at 17
(explaining that if defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant would be
sent to a psychiatric facility rather than granted freedom); Lane Lambert, LocalPublic: He Got
What He Deserved, Patriot Ledger (Quincy, MA), Mar. 19, 1996, at 7 (showing that if an insanity
defense is successfully asserted, the defendant could spend the rest of his life in a mental
hospital instead of the state prison);
185. See generally Graciela Sevilla, At Rapist's Sanity Trial Woman Recounts Attack, Assault Was
'Methodical' Victim Says, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1994, at B5 (quoting victim at a rapist's sanity trial
that her attacker "didn't seem frenzied.").
186. See Barbara Linn, Jury Rejects Insanity Defense, Convicts Ex-TCU Student of Murder, Houst.
Post, Jan. 7, 1994, at A22.
187. See Charles Carr, Savona Case Spotlights Issue of Insanity vs. Responsibility, Buff. News,
Aug. 21, 1994, at FT; Terzian, supra note 176; Guillermo Garcia, Delay Asked in Fiiaggi Tria4
Clev. Plain Dealer, Jan. 6, 1995, at 23. See generally James Wilson, Reading Jurors' Minds:
Subjectivity ofJuries, 101 Commentary 45 (1996).
188. SeeJoseph H. Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and
Legal R1eoinders, 14 Rutgers LJ. 397, 481 (1983).
189. See id. at 401; see also Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity
Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L 331, 334 (1991) (finding
that the insanity defense was raised in nearly one percent of all felony cases).
190. See Rodriguez ct al., supra note 188, at 402.
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NGRI than persons charged with other crimes. 9'
Thus, contrary to myth, there is a high risk to the defendant who
pleads insanity and is unsuccessful. Defendants who asserted an insanity
defense at trial, and who were ultimately found guilty of their charges,
served significantly longer sentences than defendants tried on similar
charges who did not assert the insanity defense. The same ratio is found
when only homicide cases are considered.'92  Furthermore, insanity
acquittees are not quickly released from custody. A comprehensive study of
California practice showed that only one percent of insanity acquittees were
released following their NGRI verdict and that another four percent were
placed on conditional release, the remaining ninety-five percent being
hospitalized.' 93 Additionally, they spend more time in custody-almost
double the time-as do defendants convicted of the same offenses, and in
California, those found NGRI of non-violent crimes were confined for
periods over nine times as long.'
94
Perhaps the oldest of the insanity defense myths is that criminal
defendants who plead insanity are usually faking, a myth that has bedeviled
American jurisprudence since the mid-nineteenth century. Of the 141
individuals found NGRI in one jurisdiction over an eight year period, there
was no dispute that 115 were schizophrenic (including thirty-eight of the
forty-six cases involving a victim's death), and in only three cases was the
diagnostician unwilling or unable to specify the nature of the patient's
mental illness.' 95 And finally, it is a myth that most insanity defense trials
feature "battles of the experts," a myth reinforced by the circus-like
atmosphere of the Hinckley trial. On the average, there is examiner
116agreement in eighty-eight percent of all insanity cases.
The "default drive" of prosecutors is simply to argue that the
defendant was faking or malingering, 97 suggesting that insanity pleaders
191. See HenryJ. Steadman et al., Factors Associated With a Successful Insanity Plea, 140 Am. J.
Psychiatry 401, 402-03 (1983).
192. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 188, at 401-02.
193. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Before and After Hinckley: Evaluating Insanity Defense
Reform 58 (1993).
194. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 188, at 403-04; see also Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guilly
By Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 237, 240 (1986) (insanity
acquittees do not spend fewer days in confinement via an NGRI plea than had they been
convicted and sentenced); Steadman et al., supra note 193, at 58-61.
195. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 188, at 404; Michael R. Hawkins & Richard A.
Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing the Insanity Plea 53 Psychol. Rep. 191, 194 (1983)
(citing studies).
196. See Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded, 141 Am. J.
Psychiatry 885, 885-86 (1984); cf. Kenneth Fnkunaga et al., Insanity Plea: InterexaminerAgreement
and Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 Law & Hum. Behav. 325, 326 (1981)
(finding that there was unanimous agreement in 92% of the cases concerning the mental
state of the defendant).
197. See e.g., Jeffrey Brainard, Accused Killer Avoids Another Tria, St. Petersburg Times, May
25, 1996, at 1 (describing prosecutors' and some psychologists' belief that defendant was
attempting to malinger, or to fake illness); Jury Gets Duran Case, Tampa Trib., Apr. 4, 1995, at
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be given "a little fake Oscar,""' or that defendants charged with
outrageous crimes merely need find a psychiatrist willing to believe a "story
of mental disorder in order to assure that they are sent 'home free.'" 19
Criminal defense lawyers refer to their own insanity-pleading clients as "a
monster, a Frankenstein.
" 200
Potential jurors are sometimes excused because they appear too eager
to sit on insanity defense cases (and certainly not because of their desire to
entre an NGRI verdict).201 When interviewed, families of crime victims
regularly report that, in their opinions, insanity-pleading defendants are
"fakers who aren't sick."20 2 Or that "everybody pleads that [defense]."2 3
In one instance a spokesperson for the American Psychiatric Association
misinformed the press as to the appropriate test for assessing the need for
continuing confinement of insanity acquittees.
2 °4
Politicians focus on abolition of the insanity defense as a panacea for
urban crime problems, calling it "one of the absurdities of state law," 2,5
providing a hiding place for criminals "to avoid responsibility." 20
Legislative candidates point to insanity defense support as an indicia of an
21opponent being soft on crime, 07 and others point to their opposition to
Nation/World 5; Glenn O'Neal, Defense of James Floyd Davis Begins, Asheville (N.C.) Citizen-
Times, Sept. 27, 1996, at Al; Tom Pelton, Robles Is Sane, Expert Testifies, Chi. Trib., Dec. 21,
1994, at 1 (reporting that psychiatrist indicated that the defendant faked symptoms to appear
mentally ill); Ronald Sullivan, Bridge Gunman Thought of Beirut, Witness Says, N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1994, at B3; Beth Taylor, Kaplan Heard Orders to Shoot, Lawyer Says, Orlando Sentinel, Feb.
1, 1995, at C1 (quoting prosecutor who characterized defendant asserting insanity defense as a
"malingerer").
198. Jim Walsh, Rape Defendant Guilty: Insanity Argument Fails; Claimed Multiple Personalities,
Ariz. Republic, Feb. 11, 1994, at BI.
199. People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
200. J.W. Brown, Lawyer Calls Client a Monster; Jury Told Man Was Insane During Slaying of
Librarian, Phoenix Gazette, Apr. 5, 1994, at Bi.
201. See Ben L. Kaufman, Benchmarks: Murder Conviction Is Upheld; Appeals Judges Reject Race,
Publicity Claims, Cin. Enquirer, Oct. 2, 1994, at B6.
202. Karen Bowers, The Committed: The State Pours Millions of Dollars-and Controversial Social
Theory-Into a Prison for Mentally Ill Felons; Deny. Westword, July 25, 1996; see also Karen Fernau,
Murder Suspect "Competent" Now, Phoenix Gazette, Mar. 17, 1994, at B2; Nea Hall, Cocaine
Psychosis "Trendy"Defense in Getting the Hooked off the Hook, Vancouver Sun, Mar. 3, 1994, at B3.
203. Insanity Defense Reform Possible in Child Killing, UPI Regional News, Aug. 27, 1992.
204. Cameron McWhirter, 'Wat Do You Want To Do With Them?', Cin. Enquirer, Dec. 19,
1994, at A14 (quoting APA spokeswoman as saying that the problem after a defendant is
declared insane is "when someone becomes cognizant of what they've done, what do you want
[to] do with them?")
205. Don Aucoin, Move Afoot to Replace Insanity Plea in Mass., Boston Globe, Mar. 31, 1994,
at 34.
206. Prisoners, Gun Control Lose in Session, UPI, Sept. 1, 1994.
207. See Patricia Baden, Foley Says Wynia is Soft on Crime, Star Trib., Aug. 23, 1994, at B5;
Joan Duffy, Ark. Strives to Deveop Law on Insane Criminals, Mem. Com. Appeal, Nov. 18, 1994, at
BI; Tali Fang, Coffman Wins GOP Seat Vacated by Owens, Rocky Mtn. News, Dec. 16, 1994, at
A20; Fisher Accused of About-Face on Insanity Plea, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 21, 1994, at C5;
Karen Levine, Insanity Defense Questioned, Mass. Law. Wkly., April 11, 1994, at 28; Larry
Williams, Republicans "Tae Curry to Task for Votes in 1979-1981, Hartford Courant, Oct. 29, 1994,
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the insanity defense as part of campaign strategy."0 8 And these positions
are regularly endorsed in newspaper editorials2" and letters to the
editor.210 In the words of a thirteen-year-old-perhaps one polled by
Parade magazine?-writing about the OJ. trial to the Fresno Bee
Of course, if he did do it, there's always the good old
temporary insanity defense, a sure-fire way to bail out of just
about any heinous crime, especially murder.
C. The Roots of the Myths
So, why do these myths persist? Why did the myths originally emerge?
Why have they shown such remarkable longevity? Why do cases such as
Hinckley's have such a profound effect on the perpetuation of the myths?
Why do they appear essential to the continued order of society? Why do
they continue to capture a significant portion of the general public and
the legal community? How do they reflect a "community consciousness"?
Finally, why may their persistence doom any attempt to establish a rational
insanity defense jurisprudence, no matter how much conflicting empirical
data is revealed?
212
To answer these questions it is necessary to look at the myths' roots.
An examination of the literature and the caselaw reveals at least four
reasons for the myths' persistence:
1. The fear that defendants will "beat the rap" through
fakery, a millennium-old fear which has its roots in a general
disbelief in mental illness, and a deep-seeded distrust of
manipulative criminal defense lawyers invested with the ability to
213dupe jurors into accepting spurious expert testimony.
2. The sense among the legal community and the general
public that there is something different about mental illness and
organic illness, so that, while certain physiological disabilities may
be seen as legitimately exculpatory, emotional handicaps are
at A10; Larry Williams, Rowland's New Television Campaign Ads, Hartford Courant, Oct. 21,
1994, at A14.
208. See, e.g., James Bradshaw, Fisher Drums a Crime Beat in Re-Election Bid, Columbus
Dispatch, Feb. 15, 1994, at 1C; Texas GOP Opens Fall Campaign with Convention, AP Political
Service, Sept. 13, 1982; Position Paper, The Pete Wilson Record on Fighting Crime, 1996
Presidential Campaign Press Materials, Aug. 22, 1995, availble in LEXIS, CMPGN Library,
ELCT96 File; Weld Calls for End to Insanity Defense Boston Herald, Sept. 28, 1995, at 5.
209. Editorial, Insanity Should Be an Explanation, Not an Excuse, for Criminal Behavior, Ft.
Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Apr. 3, 1994, at G4; Editorial, Sanity on Insanity, Boston Globe, Apr.
1, 1994, at 18; Perspective: What Other Newspapers Are Saying, Chi. Trib., Apr. 9, 1994, at 19
(quoting Marian (Ohio) Star). On the role of media distortions, see Silver et al., supra note
124, at 69.
210. See, e.g., Henry Haustra, Crime Solution, Fresno Bee, Jan. 11, 1994, at B4.
211. Lisa Calvino, Too Much Time; Fresno Bee, Feb. 12, 1995, at B10.
212. On the extent of these distortions, see Silver et al., su/pra note 126, at 68-69.
213. See Philip Resnick, Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony: A Historical Perspective on the
Hysterical Invective, 14 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 203, 206 (1986) (noting that concern
dates to the tenth century).
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not.
2 4
3. The demand that a defendant conform to popular images
of extreme craziness in order to be legitimately insane, a demand
with which Chief Justice Rehnquist and other members of the
current Supreme Court appear entirely comfortable. 21 5
4. A fear that the soft, exculpatory sciences of psychiatry and
psychology, claiming expertise in almost all areas of behavior, will
somehow overwhelm the criminal justice system by thwarting the
system's crime control component.
The following section addresses the most important of these reasons,
the fear of faking, in greater detail.1 6
D. Fear of Faking1
Historically, society believed that insanity was too easily feigned, that
psychiatrists were easily deceived by such simulation, and that the use of
the defense was "an easy way to escape punishment. 2 1 8 Because it could
not be demonstrated conclusively that insanity had some "observable
'material' existence," charges of "counterfeit [ing]" insanity quickly
arose.2 1 9 When Judge Darling characterized insanity in 1911 as "the last
refuge of a hopeless defence, "22° the factual basis of his assertion went
unchallenged. As recently as 1986, Justice Lavorato of the Iowa Supreme
Court, dissenting from a decision upholding the constitutionality of placing
the burden of proof on the defendant in an insanity case, pointed out,
"Placing proof of insanity with the defense originated over a hundred years
ago with judicial concerns that cunning defendants might pull one over snifing
,,Or. 
p221jurors.02
This fear of successful deception, which has "permeated the American
legal system for over a century,"2 was seen as significantly weakening the
214. See generally Kulynych, supra note 30 (discussing neuroimaging).
215. Perlin, supra note 19, at 233.
216. The other myths are discussed extensively in Perlin, supra note 19, at 247-62.
217. This section is generally adapted from id. at 236-47.
218. Diane B. Bartley, State v. Field: Wisconsin Focuses on Public Protection by Reviving
Automatic Commitment Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 781, 784. For what
is probably the first recorded example of feigned insanity, see H.H. Cohn, Some Psychiatric
Phenomena in Ancient Law, in Psychiatry, L. & Ethics 59, 61 (A. Carmi et al. eds., 1986)
(discussing David's decision to feign mental disorder so as to escape from King Saul, see 1
Samuel 21:13-16); see also Robert P. Brittain, The History of Legal Medicine: The Assizes ofJerusalem,
34 Medico-Legal J. 72, 72-73 (1966) (discussing the possibility of feigning illness to avoid trial
in European feudal states and methods of detection).
219. Joel Peter Eigen, Historical Developments in Psychiatric Forensic Evidence: The British
Experience, 6 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 423, 427 (1984). Thus, in 1681, Sir Robert Holbrun wrote,
"(A] man may counterfeit himself to be mad, he may do it so cunningly as it cannot be
discerned whether he be mad or no." I. at 427-428 (quoting G.D. Collinson, A Treatise on
the Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons "Non Compotes Mentis" (1812)).
220. Rex v. Thomas, 7 Cr. App. R. 36 (1911), discussed in Homer D. Crotty, The History of
Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12 Cal. L Rev. 105, 119 n.87 (1924).
221. State v. James, 393 N.W.2d 465, 470 (Iowa 1986) (Lavorato, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
222. Perlin, supra note 97, at 98; cf. Winiarz v. State, 752 P.2d 761, 763 (Nev. 1988)
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deterrent effect of the criminal law.2 The fear holds some of this
century's most respected jurists in its thrall.224 The public's fear of
feigned insanity defenses meshes with its fears of released insanity
acquittees. If a defendant can successfully feign insanity, it is feared, he will
likely be quickly released from confinement, thus both escaping his 'Justly
deserved punishment" and endangering other potential victims in the
community.m Even lawyers for insanity acquittees repeat these myths. In
a press interview following a bench trial acquitting his client, defense
counsel Jerome Ballarotto stated, "Everybody who knew [the defendant]
knew something wasn't right about this .... Prosecutors generally scoff at
this type of defense, but in this case, it was true."2'
Yet this fear is unfounded.22 There is virtually no evidence that
feigned insanity has ever been a remotely significant problem of criminal
procedure, even after more "liberal" substantive insanity tests were
adopted. A survey of the case law reveals no more than a handful of cases
in which a defendant free of mental disorder "bamboozled"28 a court or
jury into a spurious insanity acquittal.22
(deciding it was reversible error for psychiatric expert to testify defendant was "feigning" in
homicide cased where defendant pled mistake and misadventure as defenses). The alleged
ease with which insanity can be feigned is also cited as a rationale for the tort law doctrine
imposing tort liability on the "insane." See, e.g., Williams by Williams v. Kearbey by & through
Kearbey, 775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §
895J, cmt. a (1977)).
For a more recent historical analysis, see Jeffrey Geller et al., Feigned Insanity in
Nineteenth Century America: Experts, Explanations and Exculpations, 20 Anglo-Amer. L. Rev. 443
(1991).
223. Julian N. Eule, The Presumption of Saniy: Bursting the Bubble, 25 UCLA L Rev. 637, 649
(1978).
224. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (Harlan, J.); United States v.
Brown, 478 F. 2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (LeventhaI,J.) (quoting Lynch).
225. See Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination,
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 261, 361 (1987); see also Elyce H. Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of
Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 562, 569 (1985); ABA
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Commentary to Standard 7-7.3, at 409-10 (1989).
226. Booth, Trenton Firefighter Acquitted; Temporary Insanity Cited in 1991 Attack The
(Trenton, NJ) Times, March 17, 1993, at A19. The defendant, a fireman, had suffered organic
brain damage after having been struck on the head by a rock eight months prior to the
incident that gave rise to the criminal charges. Id.
227. See Elizabeth Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally I,
12J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 67, 75 (1995).
228. United States v. Carter, 415 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1975).
Even the most vociferous opponents of the insanity defense are usually unable to cite
actual examples of defendants who escaped justice by pretending to be mentally ill.
United States Attorney Guiliani, when pressed on this point cited the novel Anatomy
of a Murder as a "perfect example of how you can manipulate and use the insanity
defense." Needless to say, while Anatomy of a Murder is an excellent novel, it is still
only fiction.
Mickenberg, supra note 34, at 981 (footnote omitted) (italics supplied).
229. See People v. Lockett, 468 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (granting state's motion
to vacate defendant's NGRI plea on ground defendant defrauded court); People v. Schmidt,
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Recent carefully-crafted empirical studies have clearly demonstrated
that malingering among insanity defendants is, and traditionally has been,
statistically low.23 Even where it is attempted, it is fairly easy to discover
(if sophisticated diagnostic tools are used).2' Clinicians correctly classifiy
ninety-two to ninety-five percent of all subjects as either faking or not
faking,2 32 especially in cases where defendants are faking severe forms of
mental illness.33 Some of these cases involve defendants who, although
155 N.Y.S. 1132 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1915), affid by 112 N.E. 755 (N.Y. 1916). The defendant
was unsuccessful in his effort in State v. Simonson, 669 P.2d 1092 (N.M. 1983), and in Sollars v.
State, 316 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1957).
Other anecdotal instances of feigned insanity are discussed in Sauer v, United States, 241
F.2d 640, 648 n.21 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1958) (case of Martin Leven,
discussed in Wertham, The Show of Violence (1949)) and in Rudolph J. Gerber, The Insanity
Defense Revisited, 1984 Ariz. St. LJ. 83, 117-118 (speculating that President Nixon's charges that
the insanity defense had been subject to unconscionable abuse by defendants stemmed from
his reading press accounts of the case of United States v. Trapnell 495 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied., 419 U.S. 851 (1974), where the court admitted evidence that Trapnell, while a
patient at a hospital, had counseled a fellow patient, Padilla, about how to feign insanity).
Padilla subsequently had charges against him dropped and attributed his success to Trapnell's
teachings on the art of acting insane. Id. at 24. For the complete story of Garrett Trapnell, see
Elliot Asinof, The Fox Is Crazy Too: The True Story of Garrett Trapnell, Adventurer,
Skyjacker, Bank Robber, Con Man, Lover (1976).
230. See Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed by
Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 375, 380-81 (1989) (discussing a study
in which "clinicians diagnosed 8% of criminal defendants as malingering psychotic
symptoms"); Linda S. Grossman & Orest E. Wasyliw, A Psychometric Study of Stereotypes: Assessment
of Malingering in a Criminal Forensic Group, 52J. Personal. Assessment 549, 549 (1988) (finding
a minority of defendants clearly malingered).
For a recent and rare case reflecting this reality, see United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d
999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1993).
231. See, e.g., Robert M. Wettstein & Edward P. Mulvey, Disposition of Insanity Acquittees in
Illinois, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 11, 15 (1988) (citing a study in which 1 of 137
insanity acquittees was seen as malingering).
For recent efforts to validate assessment tools designed to screen malingering, compare
Richard Rogers et al., Improvements in the M Test as a Screening Measure for Malingering, 20 Bull.
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 101 (1992) and Richard Rogers et al., Standardized Assessment of
Malingering: Validation of the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms, 3 Psychol. Assessment: J.
Consulting & Clin. Psychol. 89 (1991), and Richard Rogers, Development of a New Classificatory
Model of Malingering; 18 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 323, 331 (1990), with David Faust,
Declarations Versus Investigations: The Case for the Special Reasoning Abilities and Capabilities of the
Expert Witness in Psychology/Psychiatry 13 J. Psychiatry & L. 33 (1985) (finding little evidence to
support clinical claims of expert capacity to accurately detect malingering). Although
Professor Donald Bersoff is generally critical of clinician accuracy in malingering detection, he
exempts Rogers's structured interview format from his criticism. See Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial
Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity
in MentalDisability Law, 46 SMU L. Rev. 329, 360 n.162 (1992).
232, See David Schreflen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates
Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 Behav. Sci. & L. 75, 75 (1990).
233. Recent evidence suggests that tests that are accurate at detecting malingering of
severe forms of psychosis may be less accurate in detecting malingering of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). See, e.g., Paul Lees-Haley, Malingering Post Traumatic Stress Disorder on
the MMPI, 2 Forensic Rep. 89 (1989). On juror suspicion in PTSD cases in general, seeJudd F.
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feigning, are nonetheless severely mentally ill.2m And the mere act of
pleading, say, multiple personality disorder syndrome is seen as
malingering in se.23
Reported cases also reveal that attempted feigning is a risky gambit,
and defendants have very few incentives to malinger:236 feigned attempts
result in abandoned insanity defenses and/or convictions.3 7 This, of
course, should not be surprising. Almost two centuries ago, it was observed
that feigning attempts would be "doomed to failure" because to "'sustain
the character of a paroxysm of active insanity would require a continuity of
exertion beyond the power of the sane person."'238
Sneirson, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2251, 2280 (1995).
234. See, e.g., People v. Kurbegovic, 188 Cal. Rptr. 268, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
that defendant "left a trail of evidence that he was not only competent but very capable of
manipulating those around him . . .. "); Barton Gellman, Acting Skills Gain Defendant an
Extended Run in Prison: Mental Illness "Charade" Doesn't Fool Cour, Wash. Post, July 6, 1989, at
C1 (discussing the case of Tyrone Robinson, in which data was consistent "both with psychosis
and with desperate malingering") (quoting Dr. William D. Strathmann).
Other individuals suffer from Munchausen Syndrome, a mental disorder in which
individuals voluntarily produce or simulate illness for no apparent purpose other than to
assume a sick role. See Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (explaining Muchausen Syndrome).
235. See Sarah K. Fields, Note, Multiple Personality Disorder and the Legal System, 46 Wash. U.
J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 261, 284-85 (1994) ("Because [Multiple Personality Disorder] is so out
of the ordinary and bizarre, when the defendant maintains that she is not guilty by reason of
insanity because of [Multiple Personality Disorder], that suspicion [of malingering] is
heightened.").
236. See id. at 287-88.
237. Compare Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 1535, 1544-46 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (abandoning
insanity defense; writ of habeas corpus granted on other grounds), and Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.
2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (upholding conviction of defendant despite insanity defense; conviction
reversed on other grounds), and People v. Bey, 562 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(affirming conviction of defendant who pled insanity defense), and People v. Swan, 557
N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same), with State v. Ondek, 584 So. 2d 282, 291 (La.
Ct. App. 1991) (finding that determination that defendant was malingering was consistent
with testimony that defendant was reading psychiatric diagnostic manual during forensic
observation). For more recent cases affirming convictions, see United States v. Duran, 891 F.
Supp. 629 (D.D.C. 1995); State v. Medina, 636 A.2d 351 (Conn. 1994); Cate v. State, 644
N.E.2d 546 (Ind. 1994); State v. Thompson, 665 So. 2d 643 (La. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Smith, 872 P.2d 966 (Or. 1994); Moranza v. State, 913 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Grim. App. 1995);
Love v. State, 909 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Grim. App. 1995).
For rare reversals in such cases, see Boggs v. State 667 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1996); State v.
Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. 1995); State v.Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1994).
238. Eigen, supra note 219, at 428 (quoting John Haslam, Medical Jurisprudence as it
Relates to Insanity According to the Laws of England 60 (Garland Publ., Inc. 1979) (1817)).
"Cases will doubtless arise where criminals will take shelter behind a professed belief
that their crime was ordained by God, just as this defendant attempted to shelter
himself behind that belief. We can safely leave such fabrications to the common sense of
juries."
People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 950 (1915) (emphasis added). But see Park Elliot Dietz, Why
the Experts Disagree: Variations in the Psychiatric Evaluation of Criminal Insanity, 477 Annals Am.
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In reality, the empirical evidence is quite to the contrary: it is much
more likely that seriously mentally disabled criminal defendants will feign
sanity in an effort not to be seen as mentally ill, even where such evidence
might serve as powerful mitigating evidence in death penalty cases. 39
Thus, juveniles imprisoned on death row were quick to tell Dr. Dorothy
Lewis and her associates, "I'm not crazy," or "I'm not a retard."
2 1
In spite of this track record, the public remains highly skeptical of the
abilities of forensic psychiatrists to determine legal insanity, 4' and
continues to insist that "people are getting away with murder and [that the
insanity defense] is an easy defense to fake."242 Prosecutors have offered,
as evidence of sanity, expert testimony that a defendant was "intelligent
enough to feign insanity."24 ' Anti-insanity defense prosecutors suggest
that only "a defendant who is faking insanity" can reasonably fear
244disclosure of his response to post-arrest Miranda warnings. Prosecutors
characterize the defense as a "fake," and the ensuing convictions are
affirmed. 45
Indeed, it may not even matter to some segment of the public
whether an insanity defense is feigned or authentic; in either case, it is
equally rejected.2 r Even insanity defense supporters such as Prof. Richard
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 84, 92 (1985) ("To ask a murder defendant claiming hallucinations
whether the voices encouraged the killing is to invite self-serving fabrications.").
239. See People v. McCleary, 567 N.E.2d 434, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that
defendant "malingered sanity"); Grossman & Cavanaugh, supra n6te 89, at 885 (arguing that
sex offenders malinger insanity); Grossman & Wasyliw, supra note 228, at 555 (finding that 22-
39% of all insanity defendants studied showed evidence of minimizing their psychopathology).
240. See Lewis, Juveniles, supra note 92 (juveniles on death row "almost uniformly tried to
hide evidence of cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms"); Lewis, Inmates supra note 92 (all
but one of sample of death row inmates studies attempted to minimie rather than exaggerate
their degree of psychiatric disorders); Taylor, Motives for Offending Among Wolent and Psychotic
Men, 147 Brit. J. Psychiatry 491, 496-97 (1985) (finding that in a sample of 211 prisoners
studied, nonpsychotic men never claimed psychotic justification for their offenses but half the
psychotic men claimed ordinary, nonpsychotic motives).
241. See, e.g., Dan Slater & Valerie Hans, Public Opinion of Forensic Psychiatry Following the
Hinckley Verdirt, 141 Am. J. Psychiatry 175, 177 (1984) (40% of those polled had "no
confidence" in expert testimony in Hinckley trial; another 20% had only "slight" confidence);
see generally Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Judgment of Legal Insanity as a Function of
Attitude Toward the Insanity Defens 8 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 67, 79-80 (1986).
242. Amy Westfeldt, Insanity Defense Rare, Very Hard to Prove, Rocky Mm. News, Feb. 11,
1996, at 42A (quoting Dr. Neal Blumberg).
243. Compare Fulgham v. Ford, 850 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1988), with Francois v.
Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1988), a case involving an insanity acquittee's habeas
corpus application for release, in which the state alleged that the defendant was "faking
sanity." Expert testimony was unanimous that sanity could be feigned for only a few hours;
"(n]o schizophrenic can feign sanity for years on end." Henderson, 850 F.2d at 235.
244. Richard M. Daley & Inge Fryklund, The Insanity Defense and the "Testimony By Proxy"
Problem, 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 497, 521 (1987).
245. See United States ex rel Ford v. O'Leary, No. 89-C-5889, 1990 WL 106498, at *2 (N.D.
Il. 1990) (denying writ of habeas corpus).
246. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("Society has
the right to protect itself from those who would commit murder and seek to avoid their
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Bonnie recommend that "an exculpatory doctrine of insanity should be
framed in a way that minimizes the risk of fabrication, abuse, and moral
mistake." 247 Dr. Isaac Ray, the father of American forensic psychiatry,
discussed the impact of these misperceptions more than a century ago:
The supposed insurmountable difficulty of distingui'hing
between feigned and real insanity has conduced, probably more
than all other causes together, to bind the legal profession to the
most rigid construction and application of the common law
relative to this disease, and is always put forward in objection to
the more humane doctrines... "'
The judiciary is similarly subject to this myth. Courts are extraordi-
narily casual in their admission of both lay and expert testimony as to
feigning. Thus, an expert's testimony that a defendant might have been
feigning "because he could be released from an institution in only a few
months" if he were found NGRI was considered improper (albeit harmless
error) only because there was no evidence in the case that the defendant
had knowledge about the possibility of his potential release following such
an insanity acquittal.2 149 Nowhere in the court's brief opinion is there any
indication as to how such testimony fits within psychiatric expertise as to
mental states. Elsewhere, a conviction was affirmed based on expert
testimony that "there is no blanket disturbance of reality just because a
person is psychotic." 25°
In another case, testimony by a psychiatrist that an institutional
chaplain had told him that he (the chaplain) felt the defendant "had
tendencies to be a manipulative type of person," was admissible since that
issue was "clearly relevant to . .. whether ... [the defendant] was a
malingerer. " 25' Again, there is no discussion of why this is "clearly
relevant " 2 2 nor of the relationship that this testimony bears to the
witness's expertise. This is especially telling in light of contemporaneous
scholarly research concluding that "unstructured interviews and projective
legitimate punishment by a subsequently contracted, or feigned, insanity."); Geis & Meier,
supra note 95, at 73 (arguing that Idaho residents hold view that persons should not be able
to avoid punitive consequences of criminal acts by reliance on "either a real or a faked plea of
insanity").
247. Richard J. Bonnie, Morality, Equality, and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Between
Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 5, 15 (1984).
248. Isaac Ray, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity § 247, at 243 (1962 ed.); see generally,
Richard Rogers, Feigned Mental Illness, 26 Prof. Psychol. 312, 313 (1989) (labeling current
model of malingering as "puritanical," and concluding it is "scientifically indefensible").
The issue of how jurors respond to fabricated defenses in general is discussed in State v.
Eaton, 633 P.2d 921, 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (involving defendant who claimed alcohol-
induced blackout). See also Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A
Reply to Professor MeirDan-Cohen, 17J. Grim. L. & Criminology 69, 76 (1986) (discussing courts'
fears of fabrication in cases involving prison inmates claiming duress in escape cases).
249. People v. Christopher, 566 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
250. Abbott v. Cunningham, 959 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992).
251. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 678 (Ky. 1990).
252. Id.
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tests are the least effective ways to identify malingerers. " s
Courts are pretextual and teleological in the way they construe
malingering testimony.2" Where a defendant who committed a brutal
murder gave himself up to police authorities, confessed and showed no
remorse for the killing, the court found that this evidence "wholly
refute[d]" expert testimony as to defendant's insanity, leading to the initial
conclusion that the defendant "concocted" evidence of delusions,25 and
to the broader holding that expert opinions are "especially entitled to little
or no weight" when based upon a "feigned state of mind. " 2s6 Elsewhere, a
court supported a finding that the defendant had "feigned incoherence"
on evidence that his previous institutionalizations had made him "aware" of
how to act during a psychological evaluation.s 7 In neither of these
instances is there any social science basis offered by the court to support its
conclusions.
Lurking beneath the surface of this myth is another truism: that the
"'insanity dodge' has come into existence by popular concept as a symbol
of sharp practice by unscrupulous attorneys and none too honest medical
men.2''z s Thus, a comprehensive survey in the District of Columbia
showed that court distrust of psychiatrists was "fully matched by distrust of
defense counsel who appeared unorthodox in their approach to the
insanity defense." 29 The parallels to the perception of the role of lawyers
in death penalty cases '°  and in challenges to involuntary civil
253. James R.P. Ogloff, The Admissibility of ExJpert Testimony Regarding Malingering and
Deception, 8 Behav. Sci. & L. 27, 35 (1990).
254. See Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary
Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L.
131, 133-34 (1991).
255. Commonwealth v. Patskin, 100 A.2d 472, 473 (Pa. 1953).
256. Id. at 475.
257. State v. Carr, 435 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Neb. 1989).
258. White, sunra note 65, at 3; see Henry Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal
Defense 8 (1954); see generally, Terri M. Couler, The Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence to Rebut the
Insanity Defense: A New Exception To the Exclusionary Rule? 74J. Grim. L. & Criminology 391, 402
(1983) ("The public believes that defendants escape punishment by means of the 'insanity
dodge,' developed by shrewd lawyers and amenable experts.").
259. Richard Arens & Jackwell Susman, Judges, .Jury Charges and Insanity, 12 How. LJ. 1, 5
(1966). Of 27 defense lawyers interviewed, "all but one expressed the view that [D.C.] District
Court judges viewed the insanity defense with suspicion and at times hostility." Id. at 6; see also
Ingo Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense 39 Rutgers L Rev. 289, 315 (1987)
("[t]he promise of treatment may draw defense counsel to the GBMI plea in cases in which
an insanity defense is unlikely to succeed.").
260. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and 1he Constitution, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1741, 1793 (1987). Burt characterized Justice Rehnquist's dissent from certiorari in
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (criticizing extensive judicial inquiry into capital
punishment as a "mockery of our criminal justice system"), as reflective of the fear that
"shyster lawyers [have been) so successful in tricking gullible federal and state judges." Burt,
supra, at 1793. On the relationship between death penalty views and insanity defense views,
see Ellsworth et al., supra note 138, which is discussed in supra notes 136-40 and accompanying
text.
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commitment standards 6' are remarkable.
Forensic psychiatrists testifying in criminal cases were similarly viewed
"as attempting to cloud our moral standards and to ignore the limits of
community tolerance." 26 2 From their first involvement in court proceed-
ings, "'alienists' ... have been perceived as a threat to public security and
a fancy means for 'getting criminals off."' 26 Yet, as long as seventy-five
years ago, William A. White responded to these charges: "[I]n my personal
experience I have never known a criminal to escape conviction on the plea
of 'insanity' where the evidence did not warrant such a verdict [except in
jury nullification cases].,, 264 Although the story was greeted initially with
some amusement, the fact that the New Mexico legislature passed
legislation last year (subsequently vetoed by the state's governor) that
would have required a mental health professional testifying during
competency hearings to "wear a cone-shaped hat that is not less than two
feet tall [, that's] surface... shall be imprinted with stars and lightning
bolts, " 2 6it suggests that little has changed over the past century.
Another reason that experts are viewed as unnecessary to the process
is because the subject of their testimony appears to be within the lay
individual's realm of ordinary common sense. The Seventh Circuit recently
noted that, while psychologists and psychiatrists may sometimes
demonstrate a "genuine expertise," their testimony is often "nothing more
than fancy phrases for common sense."2  In a recent commentary in a
261. See Michael L. Perlin, Book Review of Ann B. Johnson, Out of Bedlam: The Truth About
Deinstitutionalization (1990), 8 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 557, 558-60 (1991) (reviewing Ann
Bradon Johnson, Out of Bedlam: The Trth About Deinstitutionalization (1990) (refuting
arguments blaming post-deinstitutionalization social problems on patients' rights lawyers)). See
generally Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
Disability Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 39, 42-43 (1992) (discussing counsel available to
mentally disabled and, if counsel is not available, the impact "on mental disability law and the
lives of the population in question").
262. William D. Weitzel, Public Skepticism: Forensic Psychiatry's Albatross, 5 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 456, 459 (1977).
263. Andrew S. Watson, On the Preparation and Use of Psychiatric Expert Testimony: Some
Suggestions in an Ongoing Controversy, 6 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 226, 226 (1978); f.
Alan A. Stone, The Ethical Boundaries of Forensic Psychiatry: A View from the Ivory Tower, 12 Bull.
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 209, 214 (1984):
Indeed it seems there is a very comfortable ideological fit between being a forensic
psychiatrist and being against capital punishment; being therapeutic rather than
punitive; being against the prosecution and what was seen as the harsh status quo in
criminal law. This ideological fit has begun to come apart in recent history, but
during the days when David Bazelon and American psychiatry had their love affair,
the fit was real. Those were the halcyon days when the concept of treatment and the
concept of social justice were virtually indistinguishable.
264. White, supra note 65, at 3 (emphasis added).
265. Psychological Limits, Clev. Plain Dealer, Feb. 8, 1996, at 1OE (quoting'S. 459, 42nd
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1995)).
266. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1996). But see People v. Strader,
663 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996) ("[Tjhis court is not prepared to say that the entire
field of psychology is a mater of knowledge common to all.").
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state bar journal, a Pennsylvania attorney put it this way:
An "expert witness" is generally defined as one possessing,
with reference to a particular subject, knowledge not acquired by
ordinary persons. But what facet of human behavior is foreign to
the average judge or jury? Who hasn't felt rage, anger, loss,
despair, self-pity, fear, and depression? Haven't we all been in the
vise-like grip of an irresistible impulse only to be surprised when a
little self-restraint caused it to loosen its grip?
67
In short, the fear of feigned insanity and the distrust of expert
witnesses' ability to identify malingering behavior continue to dominate
insanity defense jurisprudence. The empirical data suggesting that this
problem is minimal continues to be trivialized, and judges, legislators and
jurors continue to adhere to this most powerful of all myths.
V. THE INSANrIY DEFENSE IN IOWA
Stories in the popular media about insanity defense cases from Iowa
in the past few years similarly reflect traditional insanity defense myths. An
editorial in the Omaha World-Herald about a series of Iowa and Nebraska
cases charged that decisions that expanded the insanity defense were
"dangerous" because they "encourage d] people of weak character to call
themselves victims to justify their irresponsible behavior.",26' In an
interview with the Des Moines Register,269 Drake Law University Law School
Professor Robert Rigg characterized the defense in Iowa as "very, very
unpopular," pointing out that a segment of the public believed it to be
nothing more than "a song and dance a lawyer concocts to get the client
off. 270 A local sheriff referred to a defendant, who pleaded insanity after
allegedly murdering another woman in order to obtain that woman's child,
as "a very good thespian," who was "trying to fool" her jailers as she
awaited trial.2 ' And, after a jury found a fourteen-year-old girl (tried as
an adult) guilty of murdering her great aunt in spite of testimony that she
was psychotic, the county attorney noted, "There was never any question
whether she did it.272
267. Gerald McOscar, Just the Facts, Please; Opinions by Mental Health Experts at Trial Are
Useless or Worse, Pa. L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at 2.
268. Editorial, At the Misguided Mercy of the Cour4 Omaha World-Herald, Mar. 31, 1995, at
20. On the way that the defense is regularly seen as encouraging irresponsible behavior, see
Rita Buitendorp, A Statutory Lesson from "Big Sky Country" on Abolishing the Insanity Defens 30
Val. U. L. Rev. 965, 976 & n.73 (1996) (discussing research reported in Hans, supra note 133).
269. Discussing a case in which a grandmother was found NGRI in the slaying of her eight
month old grandson whom she believed to be the "Antichrist."
270. Tom O'Donnell, Insanity Ruling Means Confinement for Woman, Des Moines Reg., Jan.
27, 1995 (Metro Iowa Section), at 5 (quoting Robert Rigg, visiting professor of law at Drake
University Law School).
271. Sheriff. Alleged Murderer Still Lying, Des Moines Reg., Dec. 26, 1996 (Metro Iowa
Section), at 1 (quoting Sheriff Dove Ireland).
272. Dan Eggen, Girl, 15, Guilty of Murder, Will Get Life, Des Moines Reg., Dec. 19, 1995
(Metro Iowa Section), at I (quoting Polk County AttorneyJohn Sarcone).
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Although local lawyers describe the defense as "a tough defense to
sell" 273 and although local jurors are perceived as possessing "legendary"
skepticism about a verdict seen as a way to "wiggle" out of a prison
sentence, 4 Iowa appears to be precisely in line with the majority of
American jurisdictions in the way it constructs, views, contextualizes, and
treats the defense: as a meretricious ploy that encourages irresponsible
behavior on the part of defendants in the face of "factual" guilt.
VI. THE JUDICIARY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE DISCREPANCY
While the previous sections provide explanations for the disparity
between reality and society's perception of the insanity defense, they do
not indicate how the judiciary deals with the defense or the disparity. This
section provides examples which indicate that the disparity between
perception and reality also pervades the judiciary. It explains thejudiciary's
acceptance of the disparity using several overlapping constructs. These
constructs are drawn from cognitive psychology, from law, from sociology,
from philosophy and from my own invention.
The first of these constructs is heuristics. Heuristics is a cognitive
psychology construct that refers to the implicit thinking devices which
individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks. The use
of heuristics leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions and
causes decisionmakers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful
information."275 One single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains




Through the availability heuristic, individuals judge the probability or
frequency of an event based upon the ease with which they recall it,2"
leading generally to demands for harsher punishment in all cases.
2 7 8
Through the typification heuristic, people characterize a current experience
via reference to past stereotypic behavior. Through the attribution heuristic,
they interpret a wide variety of additional information to reinforce pre-
279
existing stereotypes.
273. Id. (quoting Polk County Attorney John Sarcone).
274. Frank Santiago, Iowa's Strict Rules Make Use of Insanity Plea Difficult Des Moines Reg.,
Mar. 31, 1996 (Metro Iowa Section), at 1.
275. Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competen y Questions? Stopping the
Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 Ian. L. Rev. 957, 966 n.46 (1990).
276. See generally Perlin, supra note 9, at 8-12 (describing how high-profile insanity cases
result in calls for the abolition of the defense).
277. See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'y Rev. 123, 137 (1980-81).
278. See Loretta Stalans, Citizens' Crime Stereotypes, Biased Recall and Punishment Preferences in
Abstract Cases: The Educative Role of Interpersonal Sources, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 451, 468 (1993)
(synthesizing the results and conclusions of prior studies).
279. Mark Snyder et al., Social Perception anl Interpersonal Behaviors: On the Self-Fulfilling
Nature of Social Stereot)pes, 35 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 656, 657 (1977) (arguing that "current
day attribution theorists, leave the individual 'lost in thought,' with no machinery that links
thought to action").
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The second construct is ordinary common sense (OCS). The positions
frequently taken by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in criminal
procedure cases best highlight the power of OCS as an unconscious
animator of legal decisionmaking. Such positions frequently demonstrate a
total lack of awareness of the underlying psychological issues and focus on
such superficial issues as whether a putatively mentally disabled criminal
defendant bears a "normal appearance. 28 0
These are not the first jurists to exhibit this sort of closed-mindedness.
Trial judges will typically say, "he [the defendant] doesn't look sick to me,"
or, even more revealingly, "he is as healthy as you or me. "281 In short,
advocates of OCS believe that simply by using their OCS, jurists can
determine whether defendants conform to "popular images of
'craziness. '' 28 2 If they do not the notion of a handicapping mental
disability condition is flatly, and unthinkingly, rejected.28s Thus, OCS
presupposes two "self-evident" truths: "First, everyone knows how to assess
an individual's behavior. Second, everyone knows when to blame someone
for doing wrong."
214
A third construct is sanism. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and
are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia
and ethnic bigotry.8 5  It infects both jurisprudence and lawyering
practices. Sanism is largely invisible, largely socially acceptable, and is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualiza-
286tion.
judges, legislators, attorneys and laypersons all exhibit sanist traits and
profess sanist attitudes. It is no surprise that jurors reflect and project the
conventional morality of the community, and judicial decisions in all areas
of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and
perpetuate sanist stereotypes.
211
280. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Ltd. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 1991)
(stating that both law and society are always more skeptical about a putatively mentally ill
person who has a "normal appearance" or "doesn't look sick").
281. Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting; 3 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 143, 147 (1975).
282. Harold D. Lasswell, Foreword to Richard Arens, The Insanity Defense at xi (1974).
283. Id.
284. Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of
Confessions, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729, 738 (1988).
285. On the way that insanity decisionmaking often reflects and incorporates racist
stereotyping, see Hava B. Villaverde, Racism in the Insanity Defense, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 209
(1995).
286. See generally Perlin, supra note 20; Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental
Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J. L. & Health 15 (1993-94); Michael L. Perlin &
Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law
Jurisprudence, 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 47 (1993).
287. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and
Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 New Eng. J. on Grim. & Civ. Confinement 369
(1994).
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The concept of sanism must be considered concurrently with that of
pretextuality. Sanist attitudes often lead to pretextual decisions. Fact-finders
accept, either implicitly or explicitly, testimonial dishonesty and engage
similarly in dishonest, frequently meretricious, decisionmaking, specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.' , 2ss
This is problematic for two reasons. First, the pretexts of the forensic
mental health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic
experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders. Second, experts
frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential concepts of
morality and openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria that impose
rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that
articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency-to-
stand-trial finding.
8 9
The final construct to consider is teleology. The legal system selectively,
teleologically, either accepts or rejects social science evidence depending
on whether or not the use of that data meets the system's a priori needs.
In cases where fact-finders are hostile to social science teachings, such data
often meets with tremendous judicial resistance, evidenced by the courts'
expression of their skepticism about, suspicions of, and hostilities toward
such evidence.2"
Courts are often threatened by the use of such data. Social science's
"complexities [may] shake the judge's confidence in imposed solu-
tions." 29' Courts' general dislike of social science is reflected in the self-
articulated claims that judges are unable to understand the data and
unable to apply it properly to a particular case. 2 Thus, social science
literature and studies that enable courts to meet predetermined sanist ends
are often privileged while data that would require judges to question such
ends are frequently rejected. 3 Judges often select certain proferred data
that adheres to their pre-existing social and political attitudes, and use
heuristic reasoning in rationalizing such decisions. Social science data is
used pretextually in such cases and is ignored in other cases to rationalize
otherwise baseless judicial decisions.
288. See generally Perlin, supra note 21.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 Am. J.L. & Med. 335, 341 (1987) (discussing Barefoot v. Estille, 463 U.S. 880
(1983)); David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding". Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 581 (1991); J. Alexander
Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 Ind. LJ.
137, 144-50 (1990).
291. See Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L.
Rev. 111, 125 n.84 (1988) (quoting David Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 284 (1977)).
292. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 275, at 986-93 (discussing decision in United States v.
Charters, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (limiting
right of pretrial detainees to refuse medication)).
293. See Appelbaum, supra note 290, at 341.
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So, how do these concepts "play out" in insanity defense cases? At the
outset, consider that the insanity defense is a textbook example of the
power of heuristic reasoning. Insanity defense defenders attempt to use
statistics to rebut empirical myths; scientific studies to demonstrate that
responsibility is a valid, externally verifiable term, and that certain insanity-
pleading defendants are, simply, different, and principles of moral
philosophy to prove that responsibility and causation questions are
legitimate ones for moral and legal inquiry. On the other hand, the vivid
anecdote or the self-affirming attribution overwhelm all attempts at rational
discourse. Insanity defense decisionmaking is a uniquely fertile field in
which the distortive vividness effect can operate, and in which the legal
system's poor mechanisms of coping with "systematic errors in intuitive
judgment" made by heuristic "information processors" become especially
troubling. The Hinckley case-perhaps the most vivid insanity defense trial
in American legal history-is the perfect example. The discrepancy
between society's perception and the reality of the frequency of use of the
insanity defense, its success rate, and the appropriateness of its success rate
all reflect this effect.
9 4
Reliance on OCS is one of the keys to an understanding of why and
how insanity defense jurisprudence has developed. Not only is it
prereflexive and self-evident, it is also susceptible to precisely the type of
idiosyncratic, reactive decision making that has traditionally typified
insanity dfense legislation and litigation. Paradoxically, the insanity
defense is necessary precisely because it rebuts "common-sense everyday
inferences about the meaning of conduct."2 5
Empirical investigations corroborate the inappropriate application of
OCS to insanity defense decisionmaking. Judges "unconsciously express
public feelings... reflect[ing] community attitudes and biases because
they are 'close' to the community."2 6 Virtually no members of the public
can actually articulate what the substantive insanity defense test is.2 7 The
public is seriously misinformed about both the "extensiveness and
consequences" of an insanity defense plea. 8 And, the public explicitly
and consistently rejects any such defense substantively broader than the
"wild beast" test. ""'
This OCS is consistent, even in that microhandful of cases in which
defendants are acquitted by reason of insanity where it is questionable that
they were actually insane. These cases fall into three categories: (1) certain
294. See also Perlin, supra note 6, (describing in greater detail the interactions of the
aforementioned myths).
295. Sendor, supra note 30, at 1372.
296. Arens & Susman, supra note 259, at 34 n.43.
297. Valerie Hans & Dan Slater, "Plain Crazy": Lay Definitions for Legal Insanity, 7 Int'l J.L. &
Psychol. 105, 105-06 (1984).
298. Hans, supra note 135.
299. Caton F. Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and
the Insanity Defense, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 207, 226 (1987).
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women who commit infanticide,'" (2) on-duty law enforcement
officials,0 1 and (3) a "we can feel sorry for you group" with whom jurors
could empathize. 02 Over a ten-year period, over two-thirds of all insanity
acquittees in New York fell into such categories, "classes not necessarily
predisposed to commit additional crimes." 0 3 Lorena Bobbitt is a classic
example of this subgroup, members of which have been referred to as
"empathy outliers,"30 4 and "virtuous outlaws."s5" But these cases, often
simply nothing more than nullification verdicts," 6 are simply reflections
of society's imperfect OCS. Tony Mauro pointed out in a USA Today story
soon after the Bobbitt verdict that, nearly simultaneously, a Virginia judge
in the same courthouse rejected an insanity defense offered by a young
black man charged with killing a state trooper, and sentenced him to
death.07 Thus, it is not difficult to understand why the only stories in
Iowa ioewspapers about successful insanity defenses were reports of a case of
a grandmother killing her grandson (allegedly, the "Antichrist"), 0 3 of a
mother who killed her two young children, 3 9 and of a woman who
swerved her car (loaded with six family members) into the path of another
vehicle in a failed mass suicide attempt.
310
What about sanism? Insanity defense decisionmaking is often
300. For an important re-evaluation of this entire area of the law, see Michelle Oberman,
Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34 Am. Grim. L. Rev. 1
(1996).
301. The most prominent case in this category is Tornsney v. Go/d, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
302. See Richard Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research Literature, 9 J. Psychiatry &
L. 357, 375 (1981).
303. Scott Leigh Sherman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity Defens4 7 Am.J.
L. & Med. 237, 261 (1981).
304. Perlin, supra note 19, at 193.
305. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 264, 349-50.
Even here, though, our punitive spirit often prevails. Of 2221 telephone callers to a
newspaper "Sound Off Line" (concededly, a skewed sample), 1213 disagreed with the verdict,
Most Callers Disagree With "Not Guilty" Bobbitt Verdic Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 25, 1994, at A9, and
conservative columnist Thomas Sowell led his Bobbitt verdict column in this manner: "Our
'insanity' defense symbolizes the degeneration of the law that has cost the people of this
country so much in money, violence, and lives." Thomas Sowell, Insanity Defense Subverts Justice,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 6, 1994, at 7B.
306. See Perlin, supra note 6, at 704; Morning Edition: remarks of Prof Peter Arenella,
Transcript No. 1373-12 (NPR radio broadcast, June 22, 1994).
307. See Tony Mauro, Abuse as an Excuse Raises Public Outcry, USA Today, Feb. 6, 1994, at
Al.
308. See O'Donnell, supra note 270.
309. See Psychotic Mother "Not Danger to Public," Des Moines Reg., July 24, 1993, at 21; see
generally Santiago, supra note 274 (quoting Des Moines psychiatrist Michael Taylor as reporting
that "most" of the successful insanity defenses in Iowa have involved infanticide cases). But see
Wife Free, Man Pleads For Justice, Des Moines Reg., July 26, 1994 (estranged husband of
defendant criticizing her speedy release from custody, calling her "a menace to society").
310. See Gary Newman, Crash Driver Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, Omaha World-Herald,
Apr. 19, 1995, at 13SF. The defendant in that case had painted her house door red to signify
that she was the devil, and "ate dirt in an attempt to choke to death." It/.
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irrational. It rejects empiricism, science, psychology, and philosophy, and
substitutes myth, stereotype, bias, and distortion. In short, insanity defense
jurisprudence is the jurisprudence of sanism. Like the rest of the criminal
trial process, the insanity defense process is riddled by sanist stereotypes
and myths. For example:
-reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of
craziness;
-an obsessive fear of feigned mental states;
-a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and
dangerousness;
-sanctioning of the death penalty in the case of mentally retarded
defendants some defendants who are "substantially mentally
impaired," or defendants who have been found guilty but
mentally ill (GBMI);
-the incessant confusion and conflation of substantive mental
status tests, and
-the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in insanity defense
summations, arguing that insanity defenses are easily faked, that
insanity acquittees are often immediately released, and that expert
witnesses are readily duped."'
Because of sanism, society blames mentally ill individuals for their own
plight 12 and attributes deviant behavior to their character defects or
"wayward free will." 3 ' In one astonishing case, a jury rejected the insanity
defense in a case of a man who left his mother rotting in excrement on a
vermin-ridden couch for six months, implicitly endorsing the state's closing
arguments that the defendant was merely "lazy."3 1 4 Sanism, in short,
regularly and relentlessly infects the courts in the same ways that it infects
the public discourse. It synthesizes all of the irrational thinking about the
insanity defense, and helps create an environment in which groundless
myths can shape the jurisprudence. As much as any other factor, it
explains why we feel the way we do about "these people." Sanism also
provides a basis for courts to engage in pretextual reasoning in deciding
insanity defense cases.
Pretextual decisionmaking riddles the entire insanity defense
decisionmaking process; it pervades decisions by forensic hospital
administrators, police officers, expert witnesses and judges. Hospital
decisionmaking is a good example. A National Institute of Mental Health
Task Force convened in the wake of the Hinckley acquittal underscored
311. See Perlin, supra note 20, at 396.
312. See Paul Koegel, Through a Different Lens: An Anthropological Perspective on the Homeless
Mentally 111 16 Culture, Med. & Psychiatry 1, 8 (1992).
313. Harold Grasmick & Anne McGill, Religion, Attribution Style, and Punitiveness Toward
Juvenile Offenders, 32 Criminology 23, 40 (1994) (quoting Donald Capps, Religion and Child
Abuse: Perfect Together, 31 J. Sci. Study Religion 1-14 (1992)). For an exceptionally thoughtful
explanation of such constructions, see Bernard Weiner, On Sin Versus Sickness: A Theory of
Perceived Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 Am. Psychologist 957 (1993).
314. David Sommer, Man Found Guilty in Abuse of Mother, Tampa Trib., Oct. 5, 1996, at 1.
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this in its final report: "From the perspective of the Hospital, in controversial
cases such as Hinckley, the U.S. Attorney's Office can be counted upon to
oppose any conditional release recommendation." "5 As John Parry has
explained, "hospitals have been pressured by public outrage to bend over
backwards to make sure that no insanity acquittee is released too soon, even
if such pressure is contrary to the intent and spirit of being found not
guilty by reason of insanity.
316
Expert witnesses are often similarly pretextual. In one case, a testifying
doctor conceded that he may have hedged in earlier testimony as to
whether an insanity acquittee could be released "because he did not want
to be criticized should [the defendant] be released and then commit a
criminal act."'31 7 Indeed, all aspects of the judicial decisionmaking process
embody pretextuality. As discussed earlier, the fear that defendants will
fake the insanity defense to escape punishment continues to paralyze the
legal system in spite of an impressive array of empirical evidence that
reveals (1) the minuscule number of such cases, (2) the ease with which
trained clinicians are usually able to catch malingering in such cases, (3)
the inverse greater likelihood that defendants, even at grave peril to their
life, will be more likely to try to convince examiners that they're not crazy,
(4) the high risk in pleading the insanity defense (leading to statistically
significant greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity pleaders),
and (5) that most successful insanity pleaders remain in maximum security
facilities for a far greater length of time than they would have had they
been convicted on the underlying criminal indictment.3 8 In short,
pretextuality dominates insanity defense decisionmaking. The inability of
judges to disregard public opinion and inquire into whether defendants
have had fair trials is both the root and the cause of pretextuality in
insanity defense jurisprudence.
Finally, little attention has been paid in general to the role of social
science data in insanity defense decisionmaking. The law's suspicion of the
psychological sciences is well documented. Furthermore, the issues before
the courts in insanity defense cases raise such troubling issues for
decisionmakers that the courts' inherent suspicion of the social sciences is
enhanced.
This should not come as a surprise. Traditionally, social science has
315. Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory
Pane4 12 Ment. & Phys. Dis. L. Rep. 77, 96 (1988) (emphasis added).
316. John Parry, The Civil-Criminal Dichotomy in Insanity Commitment and Release Proceedings:
Hinckley and Other Matters, 11 Ment. & Phys. Dis. L. Rep. 218, 223 (1987).
Where the insanity defense has been abolished, there is often a statistically significant
increase in the number of defendants found permanently incompetent to stand trial. See
Buitendorp, supra note 268 at 993-96 (discussing the research reported in HenryJ. Steadman
et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense Under Montana's "Abolition" of the Insanity Defense; 146
Am.J. Psychiatry 357, 359-60 (1989)).
317. Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1988).
318. On the relationship between these pretexts and racial bias in insanity defense
decisionmaking, see generally, Villaverde, supra note 285.
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played less of a role in the establishment of legal policy in areas
"dominated by clear ideological division" or "political debate." 3 9 The
more that social science contradicts "sentiments essential to other legal
institutions," the less likely it is to influence legal policy.32 Professor
William Crowley, a professor of law at Montana Law School, and one of the
architects of the bill abolishing the insanity defense in that state,
responded to arguments based on empirical data by stating that he had "a
deep and basic mistrust of statistics." 3 2 And finally, consider what Judge
Farmer of the Florida District Court of Appeal said recently, concurring in
a decision that affirmed a defendant's conviction after the trial court
excluded the defendant's proferred testimony on the unreliability of some
witness identifications:
Acknowledging this is rather uncomfortable for me, for I am
no blind partisan of the academic discipline concerned. Indeed, I
should admit to a certain quarrel with the social "sciences" in
general and psychology in particular. They are, it seems to me,
founded on an almost indefensible premise: that one can fairly
deduce some truths about an individual by what classes of human
beings do in the aggregate. That seems to me so at odds with the
human free will that any conclusions founded on the premise are
intrinsically unreliable. By such methodology one might stumble
into the truth about as often as 60 computers typing randomly for
infinity might turn out all of the great literary works of western
civilization. '
Much of the incoherence of insanity defense jurisprudence can be
explained by these phenomena. Stereotyped thinking leads to sanist
behavior. Sanist decisions are rationalized by pretextuality on the part of
judges, legislators and lawyers, and are buttressed by the teleological use of
social science evidence and empirical data. This combination of sanism
and pretextuality "fits" with traditional ways of thinking about (and acting
toward) mentally disabled persons; it reifies centuries of myths and
superstitions, and is consonant with both the way society uses heuristic
cognitive devices as its faux, non-reflective "ordinary common sense," and
with the nation's authoritarian spirit and its culture of punishment.
CONCLUSION
So why did ninety percent of American teenagers say that the insanity
defense was overused?323 What is there about this area of the law that
319. J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Amdonitions, Empirical Research, and
Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 645, 648 (1992).
320. Woolhandler, supra note 291, at 119; see Richard A. Berk, The Role of Subjectivity in
Criminal Justice Classification and Prediction Methods, 7 Crim.Just. Ethics 35 (1988).
321. Buitendorp, supra note 268, at 993 n.169.
322. McMullen v. State, 660 So. 2d 340, 342-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Farmer, J.,
concurring).
323. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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inspires such near unanimity of opinion from this universe, a universe that
most likely has had no personal contact with the insanity defense system?
Structural anthropology teaches that society cannot articulate social
constructs without simultaneously articulating the opposite. "Good" is
meaningless without an understanding of the meaning of "evil." "Hot" is
meaningless without an understanding of the meaning of "cold." And, of
course, "sane" is meaningless without an understanding of the meaning of
"insane."
But society's understanding of sanity and insanity is confounded by
other factors that impede any true understanding of these terms. Society
knows that this understanding is informed, (or, better, misinformed), by
heuristics, by faux OCS, by sanism, and by pretextuality and teleology.
Society knows all of this, yet it continues blithely and blindly along the
same path it has followed for centuries. It is comfortable doing this for
many reasons. Because it fits with the collective authoritarian personality,
because it allows society to deny feelings of empathy toward criminal
defendants with severe mental disabilities, because it comports well with
the culture of punishment, and because, in structural anthropological
terms, such defendants "fail to fit well into the set of structural oppositions
that our culture gives us to organize our experience."
324
It is important to us-as individuals and as members of a larger
community-to know that there is a "borderline" separating "you from
me." Or, at the least, to believe that there is. On one hand, the insanity
defense appears to establish such a borderline between those of us who are
found to be criminally responsible for our acts and those of us who are
not. But, on the other hand, a significant portion of society believes that
the insanity defense actually blurs the borderline between good and evil,
between "good guys" and "bad guys." As in the Dylan song, we feel
"doublecrossed," because it appears that "these people" are "getting away
with it." And we feel that way even though we know-rationally and
objectively-that, in that minute statistically insignificant universe of cases
in which defendants do succeed in contested insanity defense cases, these
defendants are subsequently incarcerated in maximum security institutions
for periods of time as long as or, in many cases, much longer than they
would have spent in prison for the same offense.32e
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Murder Tria N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1996, at A10; MacQuarrie, supra note 143; Westfeldt, supra
note 240; see also All Things Considered: Interviews with Ira Mickenberg (NPR radio broadcast, Feb.
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We know this and we ignore it, because we do not care about this
objective reality, a reality about which-following the publication of Henry
Steadman's groundbreaking research-there can no longer be the shadow
of a doubt. 2" We do not care about it because this is simply an area too
emotionally freighted for us to handle. Neither our legal system nor our
individual psyches have the tensile strength required to accept the tensions
and ambiguities inherent on a maturely functioning insanity defense
system-one in which that "borderline" is inevitably so deeply blurred.
Simply put, we cannot deal with the fact that insanity-pleading defendants
may be more like us than not like us, and we thus develop elaborate
mechanisms (legal and psychological) to distance ourselves from them and
from that unacceptable reality.
So we accept an insanity defense system that is sanist, pretextual and
teleological, a system that rests on the shaky underpinnings of heuristic
reasoning and a false OCS. And this acceptance may ultimately doom to
failure any attempt to reconstitute insanity defense policy, even when
examined through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Why is this? I believe that our refusal to care about or think about the
objective realities that I have been discussing, and our dogged, banal
reliance on sanist myths and pretextual reasoning is made far easier by
both phenomena that I discussed earlier: by our authoritarian spirit, and
our culture of punishment. These phenomena allow us-encourage us-to
wilfully blind ourselves to behavioral, scientific, cultural and empirical
realities, They do this to preserve the illusion of a "borderline" between
"you and me". The evanescence of this borderline becomes, in the end,
the reason why, after centuries, our insanity defense jurisprudence
continues to operate as it always has-out of consciousness.
2, 1992).
326. See Steadman et al., supra note 193.
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